

GLOBAL JOURNAL

OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCES: F

Political Science



Beyond Bellephonic Sound

United Nations Intervention Forces

Highlights

Socio-Economic Development

Deteriorating Conditions in the West Bank

Discovering Thoughts, Inventing Future



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE

VOLUME 24 ISSUE 1 (VER. 1.0)

OPEN ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH SOCIETY

© Global Journal of Human Social Sciences. 2024.

All rights reserved.

This is a special issue published in version 1.0 of "Global Journal of Human Social Sciences." By Global Journals Inc.

All articles are open access articles distributed under "Global Journal of Human Social Sciences"

Reading License, which permits restricted use. Entire contents are copyright by of "Global Journal of Human Social Sciences" unless otherwise noted on specific articles.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission.

The opinions and statements made in this book are those of the authors concerned. Ultraculture has not verified and neither confirms nor denies any of the foregoing and no warranty or fitness is implied.

Engage with the contents herein at your own risk.

The use of this journal, and the terms and conditions for our providing information, is governed by our Disclaimer, Terms and Conditions and Privacy Policy given on our website <http://globaljournals.us/terms-and-condition/menu-id-1463/>

By referring / using / reading / any type of association / referencing this journal, this signifies and you acknowledge that you have read them and that you accept and will be bound by the terms thereof.

All information, journals, this journal, activities undertaken, materials, services and our website, terms and conditions, privacy policy, and this journal is subject to change anytime without any prior notice.

Incorporation No.: 0423089
License No.: 42125/022010/1186
Registration No.: 430374
Import-Export Code: 1109007027
Employer Identification Number (EIN):
USA Tax ID: 98-0673427

Global Journals Inc.

(A Delaware USA Incorporation with "Good Standing"; **Reg. Number: 0423089**)

Sponsors: *Open Association of Research Society*
Open Scientific Standards

Publisher's Headquarters office

Global Journals® Headquarters
945th Concord Streets,
Framingham Massachusetts Pin: 01701,
United States of America

USA Toll Free: +001-888-839-7392
USA Toll Free Fax: +001-888-839-7392

Offset Typesetting

Global Journals Incorporated
2nd, Lansdowne, Lansdowne Rd., Croydon-Surrey,
Pin: CR9 2ER, United Kingdom

Packaging & Continental Dispatching

Global Journals Pvt Ltd
E-3130 Sudama Nagar, Near Gopur Square,
Indore, M.P., Pin:452009, India

Find a correspondence nodal officer near you

To find nodal officer of your country, please
email us at local@globaljournals.org

eContacts

Press Inquiries: press@globaljournals.org
Investor Inquiries: investors@globaljournals.org
Technical Support: technology@globaljournals.org
Media & Releases: media@globaljournals.org

Pricing (Excluding Air Parcel Charges):

Yearly Subscription (Personal & Institutional)
250 USD (B/W) & 350 USD (Color)

EDITORIAL BOARD

GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE

Dr. Arturo Diaz Suarez

Ed.D., Ph.D. in Physical Education Professor at University of Murcia, Spain

Dr. Prasad V Bidarkota

Ph.D., Department of Economics Florida International University United States

Dr. Alis Puteh

Ph.D. (Edu.Policy) UUM Sintok, Kedah, Malaysia M.Ed (Curr. & Inst.) University of Houston, United States

Dr. André Luiz Pinto

Doctorate in Geology, PhD in Geosciences and Environment, Universidade Estadual Paulista Julio de Mesquita Filho, UNESP, Sao Paulo, Brazil

Dr. Hamada Hassanein

Ph.D, MA in Linguistics, BA & Education in English, Department of English, Faculty of Education, Mansoura University, Mansoura, Egypt

Dr. Asuncin Lpez-Varela

BA, MA (Hons), Ph.D. (Hons) Facultad de Filología Universidad Complutense Madrid 29040 Madrid Spain

Dr. Faisal G. Khamis

Ph.D in Statistics, Faculty of Economics & Administrative Sciences / AL-Zaytoonah University of Jordan, Jordan

Dr. Adrian Armstrong

BSc Geography, LSE, 1970 Ph.D. Geography (Geomorphology) Kings College London 1980 Ordained Priest, Church of England 1988 Taunton, Somerset, United Kingdom

Dr. Gisela Steins

Ph.D. Psychology, University of Bielefeld, Germany Professor, General and Social Psychology, University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany

Dr. Stephen E. Haggerty

Ph.D. Geology & Geophysics, University of London Associate Professor University of Massachusetts, United States

Dr. Helmut Digel

Ph.D. University of Tbingen, Germany Honorary President of German Athletic Federation (DLV), Germany

Dr. Tanyawat Khampa

Ph.d in Candidate (Social Development), MA. in Social Development, BS. in Sociology and Anthropology, Naresuan University, Thailand

Dr. Gomez-Piqueras, Pedro

Ph.D in Sport Sciences, University Castilla La Mancha, Spain

Dr. Mohammed Nasser Al-Suqri

Ph.D., M.S., B.A in Library and Information Management, Sultan Qaboos University, Oman

Dr. Giaime Berti

Ph.D. School of Economics and Management University of Florence, Italy

Dr. Valerie Zawilski

Associate Professor, Ph.D., University of Toronto MA - Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Canada

Dr. Edward C. Hoang

Ph.D., Department of Economics, University of Colorado United States

Dr. Intakhab Alam Khan

Ph.D. in Doctorate of Philosophy in Education, King Abdul Aziz University, Saudi Arabia

Dr. Kaneko Mamoru

Ph.D., Tokyo Institute of Technology Structural Engineering Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

Dr. Joaquin Linne

Ph. D in Social Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dr. Hugo Nami

Ph.D.in Anthropological Sciences, Universidad of Buenos Aires, Argentina, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Dr. Luisa dall'Acqua

Ph.D. in Sociology (Decisional Risk sector), Master MU2, College Teacher, in Philosophy (Italy), Edu-Research Group, Zrich/Lugano

Dr. Vesna Stankovic Pejnovic

Ph. D. Philosophy Zagreb, Croatia Rusveltova, Skopje Macedonia

Dr. Raymond K. H. Chan

Ph.D., Sociology, University of Essex, UK Associate Professor City University of Hong Kong, China

Dr. Tao Yang

Ohio State University M.S. Kansas State University B.E. Zhejiang University, China

Mr. Rahul Bhanubhai Chauhan

B.com., M.com., MBA, PhD (Pursuing), Assistant Professor, Parul Institute of Business Administration, Parul University, Baroda, India

Dr. Rita Mano

Ph.D. Rand Corporation and University of California, Los Angeles, USA Dep. of Human Services, University of Haifa Israel

Dr. Cosimo Magazzino

Aggregate Professor, Roma Tre University Rome, 00145, Italy

Dr. S.R. Adlin Asha Johnson

Ph.D, M. Phil., M. A., B. A in English Literature, Bharathiar University, Coimbatore, India

Dr. Thierry Feuillet

Ph.D in Geomorphology, Master's Degree in Geomorphology, University of Nantes, France

CONTENTS OF THE ISSUE

- i. Copyright Notice
 - ii. Editorial Board Members
 - iii. Chief Author and Dean
 - iv. Contents of the Issue
-
1. The Role of United Nations Intervention Forces in Protecting Civilians: From Congo to South Sudan. *1-17*
 2. Unveiling Disparities: Investigating the Gap between Palestinian Authority Counter Segregation Policies and Local Implementation Amid Deteriorating Conditions in the West Bank. *19-29*
 3. Beyond Bellephonic Sound: Exploring Some Musical Diplomacies during the Ukraine War. *31-40*
 4. Entrepreneurship Benefits in Higher Educational Institutions and its Implication on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. *41-49*
-
- v. Fellows
 - vi. Auxiliary Memberships
 - vii. Preferred Author Guidelines
 - viii. Index



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 24 Issue 1 Version 1.0 Year 2024
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

The Role of United Nations Intervention Forces in Protecting Civilians: From Congo to South Sudan

By Josias Marcos de Resende Silva, Guilherme de Araújo Grigoli, Daniel Mendes Aguiar Santos
& Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon
American Military University

Abstract- O objetivo deste artigo é examinar e comparar o impacto da Brigada de Intervenção da Força (FIB) e da Força de Proteção Regional (RPF) na proteção de civis na República Democrática do Congo e no Sudão do Sul, respectivamente. O método de pesquisa escolhido para este estudo foi a abordagem qualitativa por meio de estudos de caso que se concentraram na Missão de Estabilização da Organização das Nações Unidas na República Democrática do Congo e na Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul. Os parâmetros de comparação selecionados para este estudo foram a redução da vulnerabilidade, a neutralização de grupos armados violentos e o desenvolvimento de forças locais. Como resultado, foi possível verificar que tanto a FIB quanto a RPF tiveram um impacto positivo, embora limitado, sobre a proteção de civis e a criação de um ambiente estável. Além disso, foi observado que esse impacto positivo tende a se dissipar com o tempo.

Palavras-chave: *proteção de civis; operações de paz; forças de intervenção das nações Unidas; UNMISS; MONUSCO.*

GJHSS-F Classification: *FOR Code: 1606*



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



© 2024. Josias Marcos de Resende Silva, Guilherme de Araújo Grigoli, Daniel Mendes Aguiar Santos & Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon. This research/review article is distributed under the terms of the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). You must give appropriate credit to authors and reference this article if parts of the article are reproduced in any manner. Applicable licensing terms are at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

The Role of United Nations Intervention Forces in Protecting Civilians: From Congo to South Sudan

O Papel Das Forças de Intervenção das Nações Unidas na Proteção de Civis: Do Congo ao Sudão do Sul

Josias Marcos de Resende Silva ^α, Guilherme de Araújo Grigoli ^σ, Daniel Mendes Aguiar Santos ^ρ
& Eduardo Xavier Ferreira Glaser Migon ^ω

Abstract- O objetivo deste artigo é examinar e comparar o impacto da Brigada de Intervenção da Força (FIB) e da Força de Proteção Regional (RPF) na proteção de civis na República Democrática do Congo e no Sudão do Sul, respectivamente. O método de pesquisa escolhido para este estudo foi a abordagem qualitativa por meio de estudos de caso que se concentraram na Missão de Estabilização da Organização das Nações Unidas na República Democrática do Congo e na Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul. Os parâmetros

Author α: O Autor é Doutor em Ciências Militares pela Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército Brasileiro¹ (ECEME) e mestre em Relações Internacionais e Resolução de Conflitos pela American Military University. O autor também é major do Exército Brasileiro e serviu como oficial da equipe de operações militares na Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul de 2016 a 2017. Atualmente, é pesquisador do Núcleo de Estudos Políticos e Estratégicos de Defesa (NEPED/ECEME), do Projeto Migração e Defesa (PROCAD) e do Grupo de Pesquisa em Operações de Paz da ECEME.

e-mail: josias.silva@eb.mil.br

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3939-7925>.

Author σ: O Autor é Doutorando em Ciências Militares pela Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército Brasileiro (ECEME), pós-graduado em Ciências Militares pela ECEME e pós-graduado em Operações Militares pela Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (EsAO). O autor é tenente-coronel do Exército Brasileiro e serviu como oficial da equipe de operações militares na Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul de 2015 a 2016. Atualmente, é pesquisador do Núcleo de Estudos Políticos e Estratégicos de Defesa (NEPED/ECEME) e do Projeto Migração e Defesa (PROCAD).

e-mail: guigrigoli@gmail.com

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0406-3239>.

Author ρ: O Autor é Doutor em Ciências Militares pela Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército Brasileiro (ECEME) e pós-graduado pela Universidade Conjunta das Forças Armadas da Coreia do Sul. O autor é coronel do Exército Brasileiro e serviu como observador militar na Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul de 2011 a 2012. Atualmente, é pesquisador do Núcleo de Estudos Políticos e Estratégicos de Defesa (NEPED/ECEME) e do Laboratório de Estudos de Defesa (LED/ECEME).

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2856-7378>.

Author ω: O Autor é Doutor em Ciências Militares pela Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército Brasileiro (ECEME) e doutor em Administração pela Escola Brasileira de Administração Pública e de Empresas/Fundação Getúlio Vargas (EBAPE/FGV). O autor é coronel (reformado) do Exército Brasileiro. Atualmente, é professor de Ciências Militares da ECEME e pesquisador do Núcleo de Estudos Políticos e Estratégicos de Defesa (NEPED/ECEME), do Laboratório de Estudos de Defesa (LED/ECEME), do Instituto Universitário Militar Português, do Núcleo de Estudos Estratégicos do Comando Militar do Sudeste (NEE/CMSE) e do Grupo de Defesa, Segurança e Inteligência (DSI/USP). e-mail: eduardomigon@gmail.com

ORCID: <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8762-1701>.

de comparação selecionados para este estudo foram a redução da vulnerabilidade, a neutralização de grupos armados violentos e o desenvolvimento de forças locais. Como resultado, foi possível verificar que tanto a FIB quanto a RPF tiveram um impacto positivo, embora limitado, sobre a proteção de civis e a criação de um ambiente estável. Além disso, foi observado que esse impacto positivo tende a se dissipar com o tempo.

Palavras-chave: proteção de civis; operações de paz; forças de intervenção das nações Unidas; UNMISS; MONUSCO.

I. INTRODUÇÃO

Desde a queda do Muro de Berlim, o mundo tem testemunhado um aumento na complexidade e na intensidade das operações paz conduzidas pela Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). Nesse contexto, Lilly (2012) destaca a Missão de Estabilização da Organização das Nações Unidas na República Democrática do Congo (MONUSCO) e a Missão das Nações Unidas no Sudão do Sul (UNMISS), que receberam forças de intervenção de nível brigada em sua estrutura para maximizar seu desempenho.

No caso da República Democrática do Congo (RDC), considerando o alto nível de violência relacionado à ameaça representada pelo grupo rebelde M23, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU, por meio da Resolução 2098 (2013), criou a Brigada de Intervenção² (FIB). Assim, em 2013, pela primeira vez na história, uma operação de paz da ONU foi autorizada a realizar operações ofensivas, com o objetivo de neutralizar grupos armados não estatais que estivessem ameaçando civis e colocando em risco o cumprimento do mandato da missão (ONU, 2013).

No caso do Sudão do Sul, em 15 de dezembro de 2013, a esperança de um futuro melhor no estado recém-criado tornou-se um pesadelo quando uma onda de violência interna eclodiu em Juba, a capital do Sudão do Sul. Em questão de poucos dias, o país inteiro estava imerso em uma guerra civil (Silva, 2019). O ataque a civis resultou em uma enorme crise humanitária. Em seis locais diferentes em todo o país, a UNMISS abriu seus portões e abrigou milhares de

¹ Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército.

² Force Intervention Brigade.

deslocados internos³ (IDP) em locais de proteção de civis⁴ (PoC sites) (Lilly, 2014).

Além disso, em 8 de julho de 2016, um conflito violento eclodiu novamente em Juba, expondo a fragilidade da operação de paz da ONU e a incapacidade da UNMISS de cumprir seu novo mandato. Nesse contexto, o conflito entre o Exército de Libertação do Povo do Sudão⁵ (SPLA) e o Exército de Libertação do Povo do Sudão - em Oposição⁶ (SPLA-IO) durou apenas quatro dias, mas suas consequências foram caóticas. Vários projéteis de morteiro e outras armas de grosso calibre atingiram as bases da ONU, matando soldados da força de paz. Na zona urbana, o SPLA foi responsável pelo estupro de funcionárias de organizações não governamentais (ONGs) e pela morte de centenas de civis. Nos arredores de Juba, o SPLA-IO atacou vilarejos locais, saqueando e matando os civis que não conseguiram fugir ou encontrar refúgio nas bases da ONU. Os combates em Juba cessaram quando o SPLA, após um ataque aéreo, tomou os acantonamentos do SPLA-IO (Radio Tamazuj, 2016).

Com base nessas graves violações dos direitos humanos em Juba, a comunidade internacional reagiu e pressionou por uma operação de paz mais robusta no Sudão do Sul. Assim, o Conselho de Segurança decidiu replicar no Sudão do Sul um mecanismo semelhante à FIB. Como resultado, em 12 de agosto de 2016, a Resolução 2304 (2016), liderada pelos Estados Unidos, criou a Força de Proteção Regional⁷ (RPF) composta por 4.000 homens, incluindo helicópteros de ataque e uma unidade de forças especiais dentro da estrutura da UNMISS. Em um ambiente de conflito complexo como o do Sudão do Sul, onde a guerra continua apesar de uma década de esforços internacionais para sua resolução, a RPF foi implementada como último recurso para evitar que a UNMISS fracassasse em sua missão.

Embora seja possível encontrar algumas diferenças entre os mandatos da FIB e da RPF, suas semelhanças são inegáveis, especialmente no que diz respeito ao uso da força de forma ativa e robusta. Sob esse prisma, a pergunta de pesquisa deste estudo é: com base nos resultados obtidos pela Brigada de Intervenção na República Democrática do Congo e pela Força de Proteção Regional no Sudão do Sul, qual foi o impacto das forças de intervenção nível brigada na proteção de civis?

Para responder a essa pergunta, o objetivo deste ensaio é entender o impacto da FIB e da RPF na proteção de civis⁸ (PoC) em suas respectivas áreas de responsabilidade. Dada a semelhança de seus

mandatos, estrutura e propósito, a comparação entre a FIB e a RPF é apropriada porque se espera que ambas as forças tenham um impacto semelhante sobre a proteção dos civis em suas áreas de atuação.

Esta pesquisa é limitada no tempo entre o ano anterior ao envio de cada força de intervenção e 2020, que corresponde ao último ano completo de existência da RPF. A esse respeito, embora a RPF tenha sido chamada de "Setor Juba" desde 2019, foi somente em 2021 que a Resolução 2567 (2021b) do Conselho de Segurança da ONU transferiu oficialmente as tropas da RPF, os meios especializados e as tarefas específicas para o Setor Juba da UNMISS. Portanto, no caso da RPF, o recorte temporal desta pesquisa esteve limitado entre 2015 e 2020. Por outro lado, no caso da FIB, esta pesquisa abrangeu o período de 2012 a 2020.

Geograficamente, este estudo se limitou às duas regiões onde as forças de intervenção estavam baseadas. Essa delimitação visou isolar os locais onde as forças de intervenção eram mais ativas para coletar os resultados mais confiáveis. Assim, enquanto na RDC esta pesquisa foi limitada à província de Kivu do Norte, no Sudão do Sul a delimitação geográfica correspondeu à região da capital Juba.

Epistemologicamente, considerando a multiplicidade de atores e relações que orbitam o objeto de pesquisa, este artigo adotou os pressupostos da Teoria da Complexidade para modelar a abordagem do fenômeno relacionado ao emprego das forças de intervenção. Com foco no comportamento de sistemas adaptativos complexos, a Teoria da Complexidade propõe uma mudança no pensamento analítico tradicional para um pensamento mais holístico. Nesses sistemas complexos, a soma das partes não corresponde ao sistema como um todo, uma vez que essas partes normalmente não compreendem o ambiente volátil e os atritos encontrados em áreas de conflito. A Teoria da Complexidade destaca essa característica como não linearidade (Couture, 2007; Jervis, 1997; Mitchell, 2009; Schmitt, 1997).

Além disso, a interação entre as partes do sistema resulta em adaptação por meio de aprendizado ou evolução (Mitchell, 2009). Por esse motivo, essa teoria rejeita a afirmação reducionista de que os sistemas adaptativos complexos podem ser totalmente compreendidos por meio da análise de suas partes constituintes, uma vez que são sensíveis às relações e propriedades sistêmicas (Bousquet & Curtis, 2011) como, por exemplo, a dinâmica multidimensional relacionada aos diferentes tipos e níveis de violência que podem ser encontrados em áreas de conflito. Portanto, em um sistema adaptativo complexo, como os conflitos contemporâneos, um grande número de entidades apresenta um alto nível de interatividade não linear, o que dificulta a associação das causas e dos efeitos (Richardson & Cilliers, 2001).

³ Internally Displaced Persons.

⁴ Protection of Civilians Sites.

⁵ Sudan People's Liberation Army.

⁶ Sudan People's Liberation Army - in Opposition.

⁷ Regional Protection Force.

⁸ Protection of Civilians.

Em última análise, esta pesquisa aceita o fato de que a epistemologia baseada na complexidade se recusa a fazer previsões precisas. Em vez disso, ela proporciona uma melhor compreensão dos fenômenos complexos, ajudando a antecipar os padrões gerais dentro dos quais ocorrem eventos específicos (Rosenau, 1997).

Metodologicamente, considerando a alocação da Teoria da Complexidade como a epistemologia escolhida, o método de pesquisa selecionado para esta pesquisa foi o estudo de caso. Em particular, a pesquisa adotou dois estudos de caso: MONUSCO e UNMISS. Essas missões da ONU foram selecionadas como estudos de caso porque são os únicos exemplos de operações de paz com forças de intervenção nível brigada, incluindo unidades de forças especiais, incorporadas em sua estrutura. Em conformidade com a Teoria da Complexidade, o estudo de caso é uma investigação empírica que examina um fenômeno contemporâneo dentro de seu contexto da vida real, especialmente quando os limites entre o fenômeno e o contexto não estão claramente definidos (Yin, 2001).

Sequencialmente, após uma extensa pesquisa usando diferentes técnicas de coleta de dados, o estudo de caso colabora com a elaboração de uma teoria exploratória construída com base em inferências extraídas dos resultados da investigação (Prodanov & Freitas 2013). Assim, com base em ambos os estudos de caso, este documento usou o raciocínio indutivo para identificar padrões e tendências, prevendo o provável impacto de longo prazo das forças de intervenção na proteção de civis.

Além disso, a comparação entre os dois estudos de caso utilizou três parâmetros diferentes: redução da vulnerabilidade; neutralização de grupos armados violentos; e desenvolvimento de forças locais. Esses três parâmetros foram escolhidos porque estão ligados ao conceito operacional das Nações Unidas sobre a proteção de civis, que é uma condição essencial para que uma operação de paz da ONU alcance relativa estabilidade em uma zona de conflito.

Para corroborar os resultados, esta pesquisa complementou a análise de cada parâmetro com um indicador de PoC diferente baseado no Manual das Nações Unidas sobre a proteção de civis (ONU, 2020). Nesse contexto, enquanto a quantidade de IPDs foi associada à redução da vulnerabilidade, o número de mortes violentas foi vinculado à neutralização de grupos armados e o número de mortes por forças do Estado foi combinado com o desenvolvimento de forças locais.

As técnicas de coleta de dados usadas neste estudo foram a pesquisa bibliográfica, documental e de banco de dados, bem como a observação participante. Em primeiro lugar, a pesquisa bibliográfica concentrou-se no histórico e no cenário da RDC e do Sudão do Sul, bem como nas funções da MONUSCO e da UNMISS. Em segundo lugar, a pesquisa documental forneceu

dados sobre as missões, possibilidades e limitações da FIB e da RPF. Em terceiro lugar, a pesquisa de banco de dados concentrou-se em números relacionados à proteção de civis, como mortes violentas por grupos armados, mortes por forças do Estado e população de deslocados internos nas áreas de desdobramento da FIB e da RPF. Por fim, com relação à observação participante, três coautores desta pesquisa estiveram desdobrados na UNMISS em diferentes períodos entre 2011 e 2017, contribuindo para a coleta e interpretação dos dados.

Nesse esforço, as fontes mais utilizadas foram artigos de periódicos revisados por pares, livros de autores relevantes na área de Relações Internacionais, sites da ONU e de governos nacionais, bancos de dados de universidades e da ONU, além de documentos e manuais da ONU. A fim de coletar dados de diferentes países e perspectivas, as fontes foram pesquisadas em inglês, espanhol e português. As publicações preferencialmente cobriram o período entre 2012 e 2020, que é o foco principal desta pesquisa. No entanto, este estudo também se baseou em publicações anteriores a 2012 para estabelecer o contexto em ambos os estudos de caso.

II. O CASO DA MONUSCO

Em 1998, uma rebelião começou nas regiões de Kivu contra o governo de Kabila, atingindo grandes áreas do país. Apesar do apoio de Angola, Chade, Namíbia e Zimbábue, as milícias conseguiram manter o controle sobre as regiões do leste do país. Ruanda e Uganda foram os principais patrocinadores do movimento rebelde, também conhecido como *Congolese Rally for Democracy* (RCD) (ONU, 2019a).

Em resposta à crise no leste do Congo, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU solicitou um cessar-fogo e a retirada das forças estrangeiras e pediu aos Estados que não interferissem nos assuntos internos do país. A RDC, Angola, Namíbia, Ruanda, Uganda e Zimbábue aceitaram a proposta da ONU e assinaram o Acordo de Cessar-Fogo de Lusaka em julho de 1999. Além disso, a Resolução 1279 (1999) do Conselho de Segurança da ONU estabeleceu a Missão da Organização das Nações Unidas na República Democrática do Congo (MONUC) para observar o processo de paz, monitorar o cessar-fogo e a retirada das forças, bem como manter contato com todas as partes (Savas-Cazala, 2016). Em uma série de resoluções posteriores, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU ampliou o mandato da MONUC, atribuindo à missão da ONU várias tarefas adicionais (ONU, 2019a).

Doss (2014) critica a ineficiência da MONUC antes de 2013 e analisa os fatores que levaram ao aumento do uso da força pela ONU na RDC. Nesse cenário, alguns eventos trágicos motivaram a mudança de comportamento da ONU. Em 2010, ocorreu um

estupro em massa substancial em Kivu do Norte. Nessa ocasião, a MONUC reagiu muito lentamente, o que gerou sérias críticas da comunidade internacional. A ONU decidiu então que a operação no Congo, a MONUC, passaria a se chamar MONUSCO, para caracterizar uma nova fase da missão.

Em 2012, o motim liderado pelo grupo rebelde M23 teve uma repercussão ainda pior do que o estupro em massa. Ao mesmo tempo, as ações do M23 surpreenderam as *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo* (FARDC) e, como resultado, os rebeldes assumiram o controle total da cidade de Goma (Silva, 2018). Depois que os rebeldes do M23 tomaram Goma por 10 dias antes de se retirarem voluntariamente, causando constrangimento à missão da ONU, o ministro das Relações Exteriores da França considerou um "absurdo" que 17.000 *peacekeepers* não pudessem proteger a cidade e pediu uma revisão do mandato. Como consequência, ações violentas em massa eclodiram em Goma, onde a população apedrejou veículos da ONU e atacou as forças de paz. Usando a mídia social Twitter, os críticos internacionais começaram a se referir à missão, cuja abreviação em francês é MONUSCO, com a hashtag #MONUSELESS (Raghavan, 2013).

Em 28 de março de 2013, após a queda de Goma para as forças rebeldes, o Conselho de Segurança criou a FIB, sob o comando direto do *Force Commander* da MONUSCO, para fortalecer a operação de paz e fornecer uma capacidade militar projetada para neutralizar a ameaça representada pelos grupos armados rebeldes mais recalcitrantes (Whittle, 2015). Como resultado, a Brigada de Intervenção é formada por cerca de 3.000 soldados e consiste em três batalhões de infantaria, um batalhão de artilharia, uma companhia de reconhecimento e uma companhia de forças especiais (Namangale, 2014). Em um período muito curto de tempo após a implantação da FIB, Namangale afirma que já havia provas contundentes de que as ameaças existenciais na região haviam sido drasticamente reduzidas.

Além disso, o ICRtoP (2015) afirma que a FIB é um modelo potencialmente útil. A organização internacional chama a atenção para o fato de que o Secretário-Geral da ONU enfatizou que a FIB é um recurso indispensável para proteger os civis quando as autoridades congoleesas não o fazem. Além disso, a organização acredita que, se o Conselho de Segurança decidir seguir esse modelo no futuro, ele poderá ser uma resposta às alegações de que as forças de paz da ONU nunca usam a força para proteger os civis e cumprir seu mandato.

Müller (2015) também analisa a implementação da FIB na República Democrática do Congo. O autor afirma que, ao longo do tempo, a ONU ajustou seus princípios de manutenção da paz da neutralidade para a imparcialidade, abrindo a janela para o uso mais

amplo da força. Inicialmente, a ONU contava com seus Estados membros e outros parceiros, como a OTAN, para fornecer tropas especializadas. Recentemente, como um novo passo no desenvolvimento do uso da força em operações de manutenção da paz, o Conselho de Segurança criou a FIB, como parte da MONUSCO, para conduzir operações ofensivas precisas contra grupos armados. Assim, em vez de apenas proteger a si mesma e aos civis, a FIB deve tomar a iniciativa de rastrear e conter esses agressores. No entanto, apesar das vitórias iniciais substanciais impostas pela FIB aos grupos armados violentos, Müller levanta algumas suspeitas sobre a legitimidade do novo mecanismo da ONU, enfatizando que, idealmente, as operações de paz não se destinam a atingir seus objetivos por meio do uso da força.

Portanto, não há um consenso sobre a legitimidade do uso da força pela FIB na RDC. Nesse sentido, Hunt (2018) enfatiza que a ONU agiu de forma parcial, escolhendo o lado de um grupo armado e identificando os outros como adversários a serem derrotados militarmente. Por outro lado, o autor destaca a opinião de Jean-Marie Guéhenno, subsecretário-geral da ONU para Operações de Manutenção da Paz de 2000 a 2008, que enfatiza que a FIB contribuiu para aumentar a credibilidade da organização. Além disso, Hunt chama a atenção para o ponto de vista do governo norte-americano, que considera que a experiência com a FIB foi positiva e estabelece um parâmetro para operações de paz mais robustas no futuro.

Os principais sucessos políticos e militares iniciais da FIB consistiram em uma derrota efetiva do grupo rebelde M23, na capacidade de cooperar por meio de ações ousadas com as FARDC e na contribuição significativa para a redução de mortes violentas na região do Kivu do Norte (EPON, 2019b). Apesar das críticas internacionais em relação às operações conjuntas realizadas pela MONUSCO junto às FARDC, a relação estabelecida pela FIB e pelas Forças Armadas Congoleesas foi considerada essencial para a neutralização do M23 (Tull, 2018).

Por outro lado, Fabricius (2020) afirma que a FIB perdeu seu ímpeto nos últimos anos. Em primeiro lugar, depois de derrotar o grupo rebelde M23, não houve um engajamento real para neutralizar o segundo grupo mais perigoso: as *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR). Em segundo lugar, em 2017, a FIB lançou operações contra as Forças Democráticas Aliadas⁹ (ADF), originárias de Uganda e supostamente ligadas ao Estado Islâmico. Em dezembro de 2017, como retaliação, 14 soldados de paz tanzanianos foram mortos e mais de 50 ficaram feridos em um grande ataque da ADF a uma base da MONUSCO em Beni (Kivu do Norte). Depois disso, em

⁹ *Allied Democratic Forces.*

setembro de 2018, dois soldados sul-africanos foram feridos em outro ataque da ADF em Beni. Por fim, em novembro de 2018, uma operação integrada que incluía a FIB e as FARDC fracassou, resultando na morte de seis soldados malauianos e um tanzaniano.

Com base em todos esses eventos, há uma percepção de que a situação de segurança no leste da RDC melhorou como uma resposta imediata à implantação da FIB. No entanto, de acordo com Silva (2021), os sistemas adaptativos complexos são capazes de se adaptar e evoluir quando confrontados com pressões adicionais internas ou externas. Portanto, o surgimento da ADF, substituindo o M23 como a ameaça mais importante à MONUSCO, bem como a piora dos resultados da FIB, significam que o conflito congolês, como um sistema adaptativo complexo, parece ter evoluído ao longo dos anos para equilibrar a pressão exercida pela Brigada de Intervenção da Força.

III. O CASO DA UNMISS

As comemorações da independência em 9 de julho de 2011 estabeleceram o ponto alto da popularidade do Movimento de Libertação do Povo do Sudão¹⁰ (SPLM) no recém-criado Sudão do Sul. Após várias décadas de guerra e um tempo ainda maior subjugado ao Sudão, a dolorosa luta havia chegado a um fim promissor. Entretanto, apenas dois anos após a sonhada independência, a maioria da população do Sudão do Sul acreditava que seu país estava indo na direção errada. Questões como empregos e serviços sendo alocados de acordo com laços étnicos, falta de alimentos, pobreza e insegurança eram evidências claras de que o país estava prestes a se desintegrar (Copnall, 2014).

Os dois personagens principais do Sudão do Sul são o presidente Salva Kiir e o primeiro vice-presidente Riek Machar. Eles pertencem aos dois maiores grupos étnicos do Sudão do Sul: Dinka e Nuer, respectivamente. Além disso, enquanto Salva Kiir é o líder do Movimento/Exército de Libertação do Povo do Sudão (SPLM/A), Riek Machar lidera o Movimento/Exército de Libertação do Povo do Sudão - em Oposição (SPLM/A-IO). Esses movimentos, juntamente com seus braços armados, são as duas principais partes no complexo conflito do Sudão do Sul (Radon & Logan, 2014). Sua composição e tamanho mudam constantemente, dependendo de seu poder de barganha no momento, já que os vários grupos de milícias centrados em etnias migram do SPLA para o SPLA-IO e vice-versa com base em interesses temporários (Silva, 2019).

Em 15 de dezembro de 2013, após meses de competição política entre os principais líderes do Sudão do Sul, um violento conflito eclodiu em Juba entre o

SPLA e o SPLA-IO. Após os eventos na capital do Sudão do Sul, em dez dias a batalha atingiu todo o país, incluindo os estados de Jonglei, Unity e Upper Nile. Os rebeldes da SPLA-IO tomaram cidades importantes como Bor, Bentiu e Malakal, que foram retomadas pelas forças do governo mais tarde (Apuuli, 2015; Silva, 2019). Apuuli (2014) destaca a influência externa no conflito do Sudão do Sul, particularmente o apoio das Forças de Defesa de Uganda ao SPLA. O autor estima que entre 2.000 e 5.000 soldados ugandenses operaram no território do Sudão do Sul, incluindo apoio aéreo e tanques.

Pendle (2014) analisa a estrutura que levou o Sudão do Sul a esse conflito interno. Para explicar os confrontos de 2013, Pendle considera como as tentativas de fortalecer o Estado resultaram na interrupção das relações de poder locais entre os grupos. Em um Estado fraco e etnicamente orientado, o conflito funciona como uma ferramenta aceita localmente para que grupos opostos restabeleçam o equilíbrio de poder.

Radon e Logan (2014) concordam com Pendle e acreditam que o conflito no Sudão do Sul é uma consequência direta da má governança. Em seu artigo, os autores examinam as causas da guerra civil no Sudão do Sul, o qual eles não consideram uma nação. Radon e Logan explicam que o país é pouco povoado e tem diversidade étnica, cultural e linguística. Mais de sessenta tribos diferentes vivem dentro das fronteiras do Sudão do Sul, o que contribui para a fragmentação do país. Portanto, foi a luta contra o Sudão por um governo autônomo que uniu o Sul. Depois que a independência foi conquistada, a unidade entre os diversos grupos étnicos do Sudão do Sul entrou em colapso.

Lyman (2013) analisa as consequências do governo do SPLM no Sudão do Sul e como esse partido político selou o destino do novo país como um estado frágil. Ele também examina as forças locais e seu papel nos conflitos internos. Lyman explica que o SPLM ainda é um exército de libertação, e não um partido político. Com relação ao SPLA, o braço armado do SPLM, Lyman afirma que se trata mais de uma coalizão de milícias do que de um exército unificado. Ele também afirma que o governo do SPLM se recusa a permitir que a UNMISS tenha acesso total às áreas de conflito onde o SPLA é acusado de cometer violações dos direitos humanos.

Assim como Lyman, Warner (2016) examina o SPLA e seu papel no conflito do Sudão do Sul. O autor atribui a falta de integração em nível político à aceleração da guerra civil. Warner explica que o Exército Nacional foi construído em uma base desestabilizada. Assim, em vez de funcionar como um mecanismo de integração, o SPLA contribuiu para a fragmentação dos grupos armados no país.

¹⁰ *Sudan People's Liberation Movement.*

Depois de mais de dois anos no exílio, Riek Machar retornou a Juba em 26 de abril de 2016, trazendo consigo milhares de soldados da SPLA-IO. Desde essa data, a tensão aumentou na capital com a presença de ambos os exércitos, que, de acordo com o acordo de paz, deveriam realizar patrulhas conjuntas e proteger Juba. No entanto, pequenos confrontos entre as forças de segurança do SPLA e os membros do SPLA-IO desencadearam o conflito de 8 a 11 de julho de 2016 em Juba. Em 8 de julho de 2016, no início da noite, houve um intenso tiroteio e artilharia do lado de fora do palácio presidencial, que durou cerca de uma hora. Os combates se espalharam rapidamente pela cidade. Durante os quatro dias de intensos combates, as duas bases da ONU em Juba foram atingidas por balas e artilharia. As tropas do governo também bombardearam os locais de PoC anexados a uma base da ONU em Juba, onde vivem mais de 30.000 pessoas da etnia Nuer. Centenas de civis foram mortos durante a batalha. Além disso, dois membros da força de paz morreram e vários ficaram feridos (Radio Tamazuj, 2016).

Diante dessa situação caótica, Rossi (2016) culpa a comunidade internacional por não ter uma estratégia consensual sobre como intervir no país. Por exemplo, o Conselho de Segurança não conseguiu aplicar sanções severas ao governo do Sudão do Sul porque os Estados Unidos, a Rússia e a China não chegaram a um acordo entre si. Além disso, a UNMISS ficou sobrecarregada com a crise do Sudão do Sul, o que resultou em um aumento maciço das tropas da ONU desde sua criação em 2011.

De acordo com as descobertas de Rossi, Phayal et al. (2015) afirmam que é importante perceber que, apesar de seu tamanho relativamente grande em comparação com outras operações de paz da ONU, as tropas da UNMISS são equivalentes a apenas um quarto do tamanho do Departamento de Polícia de Nova York para um território que é aproximadamente do tamanho do Texas. Portanto, é impossível proteger todas as áreas do Sudão do Sul. Além disso, as condições das estradas são deploráveis em todo o país, impedindo o acesso por terra a vários locais, especialmente durante a estação chuvosa, de abril a novembro.

Tull (2013) também está preocupado com a eficácia da UNMISS, chamando a atenção para o fato de que, formalmente, o governo do Sudão do Sul fornece consentimento estratégico para a UNMISS. No entanto, os líderes sul-sudaneses discordam do mandato da Missão, pois acreditam que a UNMISS deveria se concentrar na fronteira com o Sudão para proporcionar estabilidade ao governo nacional. Por esse motivo, o governo do Sudão do Sul impôs muitas restrições no terreno que impedem a eficácia da UNMISS.

Em vista dessa situação hostil e como resposta ao conflito de julho de 2016 em Juba, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU criou a Força de Proteção Regional por meio da Resolução 2304 (2016), um mecanismo que traz muitas semelhanças com a FIB implantada na RDC. Além disso, por meio da mesma Resolução, o Conselho de Segurança da ONU aumentou a quantidade de tropas da Missão para 17.000 e o componente policial para 2.101 pessoas (ONU, 2016a). Em dezembro do mesmo ano, a Resolução 2327 (2016) estendeu o mandato da UNMISS com base no Capítulo VII da Carta da ONU, com o objetivo de cumprir o mandato e proteger efetivamente os civis no Sudão do Sul.

A Resolução 2327 (2016) também determinou o papel da Força de Proteção Regional no Sudão do Sul. De acordo com o mandato, a RPF deveria usar todos os meios necessários para: garantir a liberdade de movimento em Juba e seus arredores; proteger e garantir que o Aeroporto Internacional de Juba (JIA) permaneça operacional; proteger as principais instalações em Juba; e engajar efetivamente qualquer ator encontrado preparando ataques ou se engajando em ataques contra PoC *sites*, instalações da ONU, pessoal da ONU, agentes humanitários ou civis (ONU, 2016b). Além de três novos batalhões de infantaria e outras unidades de apoio, incluindo helicópteros de ataque, veículos aéreos não tripulados, engenheiros de combate e reconhecimento, a RPF foi projetada com uma unidade de forças especiais (também conhecida como Companhia de Alta Prontidão¹¹).

Com relação às partes do conflito no Sudão do Sul, em setembro de 2018, elas assinaram um novo acordo de paz intitulado Acordo Revitalizado sobre a Resolução de Conflitos no Sudão do Sul (R-ARCSS), no qual o SPLA passou a se autodenominar Forças de Defesa do Povo do Sudão do Sul¹² (SSPDF). A Autoridade Internacional para o Desenvolvimento¹³ (IGAD), o bloco regional da África Oriental, patrocinou esse novo acordo de paz após uma série de reuniões em Adis Abeba e Cartum. No entanto, o Instituto Internacional da Paz (IPI) (2019) afirma que os confrontos armados continuam entre as partes signatárias. Além disso, o governo do Sudão do Sul continua totalmente incapaz de proteger os civis da violência e permanece restringindo o acesso da UNMISS às principais áreas onde os confrontos estão ocorrendo, impedindo que a missão e os agentes humanitários protejam e ajudem a população.

Em 2020, quatro anos após a emissão da Resolução 2304 (2016), devido às dificuldades impostas pelo governo nacional, a RPF não tinha conseguido se desdobrar totalmente no Sudão do Sul,

¹¹ *High Readiness Company.*

¹² *South Sudan People's Defense Forces.*

¹³ *Intergovernmental Authority on Development.*

prejudicando o cumprimento de seu mandato. No entanto, 2 batalhões de infantaria, 1 companhia de engenharia e a Companhia de Alta Prontidão já haviam entrado em ação em Juba, aumentando as capacidades da UNMISS (ONU, 2021a).

Nesse contexto, o desdobramento parcial da RPF permitiu uma redistribuição das forças da UNMISS no Sudão do Sul, projetando uma presença maior de capacetes azuis nos estados de Equatória Ocidental, Equatória Central e Equatória Oriental. Além disso, o aumento das tropas de infantaria e os apoios especializados criaram um efeito dissuasivo em Juba, o que resultou na redução da violência (EPON, 2019a). Com base nessa realidade, Wondemagegnehu (2020) destaca que havia um desejo geral de que o Conselho de Segurança da ONU continuasse renovando o mandato da RPF e também expandisse sua área de responsabilidade.

Em 2021, a RPF foi oficialmente remodelada como Setor Juba da UNMISS (Day et al., 2020). A esse respeito, De Coning (2021) reconhece que essa decisão foi parcialmente motivada pelas objeções e obstruções do governo do Sudão do Sul à mobilização completa da RPF, conforme planejado inicialmente. No entanto, o autor afirma que essa decisão também significa que houve um avanço no processo de paz do país, que havia sido interrompido pela guerra civil. De fato, desde 2018, a dinâmica do conflito no Sudão do Sul evoluiu da violência em larga escala em todo o país para confrontos contidos em pequena escala.

De acordo com a Teoria da Complexidade, Silva (2021) explica que, em locais onde os conflitos são perenes e bem enraizados, diferentes episódios de violência são desencadeados ao longo do tempo, afetando a percepção de segurança. Portanto, o Setor de Juba agora enfrenta o desafio de manter a violência relativamente contida na capital do Sudão do Sul a fim de evitar uma propagação da violência em todo o país, melhorar a percepção de segurança e promover a construção de uma paz duradoura.

IV. COMPARAÇÃO E RECOMENDAÇÕES

A ONU explica que a estabilidade de um país, em geral, depende da capacidade da missão de proteger a população civil. Desde o início, as operações de manutenção da paz são obrigadas a intervir para interromper a violência física contra civis em sua área de responsabilidade, independentemente do nível de violência (ONU, 2020). A missão atinge esse objetivo reduzindo a vulnerabilidade de uma população civil e diminuindo as ameaças existentes (Beljan, 2014). A longo prazo, espera-se que uma operação de paz desenvolva capacidade de proteção local/nacional, já que os Estados têm a responsabilidade primária de proteger os civis (ONU, 2020).

Por esse motivo, para comparar o impacto da FIB e da RPF na proteção de civis na República Democrática do Congo e no Sudão do Sul, este documento considerou três parâmetros de comparação: redução da vulnerabilidade, neutralização de grupos armados violentos e desenvolvimento de forças locais.

a) *Redução da vulnerabilidade*

De acordo com a ONU (2020), em zonas de conflito onde foram identificadas prováveis ameaças a civis, as operações de paz devem mitigá-las ou eliminá-las antes que a violência ocorra. Enquanto a eliminação das ameaças depende do engajamento ativo dos atores violentos que ameaçam os civis, a mitigação das ameaças consiste em medidas preventivas e/ou antecipatórias capazes de garantir a segurança da população vulnerável. Nesse sentido, a dissuasão e as operações de segurança tornam-se condições essenciais para que um componente militar de uma operação de paz da ONU reduza a vulnerabilidade da população civil.

Em uma tentativa de avaliar a eficácia das operações de manutenção da paz com mandatos de PoC, Beljan (2014) descreve as táticas, técnicas e procedimentos (TTP) que traduzem a proteção de civis em tarefas militares. Nesse sentido, o patrulhamento (incluindo patrulhamento robusto/patrulhamento noturno), o envolvimento com as lideranças locais, o domínio da área, a implantação de bases operacionais móveis e o controle de infraestruturas críticas podem ser consideradas tarefas militares principais relacionadas às operações de segurança.


Na RDC, a Resolução 2502 (2019) exigia que a FIB contribuísse com a MONUSCO realizando patrulhas a pé e motorizadas, especialmente em áreas de alto risco; garantisse a liberdade de movimento; e fornecesse segurança para o pessoal e as instalações da ONU (ONU, 2019b). Composta por aproximadamente 3.000 soldados, incluindo três batalhões de infantaria, a FIB tinha uma força de trabalho considerável para realizar essas operações de segurança. Além disso, é importante observar que a FIB engloba uma companhia das forças especiais. De acordo com a ONU, tropas de forças especiais funcionam como meios estratégicos de dissuasão capazes de criar efeitos de grandes proporções para proteção da população local (ONU, 2020). Portanto, a FIB reunia operações de segurança e capacidade de dissuasão eficazes, que são requisitos importantes para reduzir a vulnerabilidade da população local.

No leste do Congo, Nduwimana (2014) afirma que a FIB funcionou como um mecanismo fundamental para a proteção de civis. O autor explica que a população local, extremamente afetada pelo conflito entre as forças do governo e os grupos rebeldes, apoiou fortemente a implantação da FIB, que

representou uma nova esperança na busca pela paz. Nduwimana também destaca alguns resultados relevantes da FIB nos primeiros dezesseis meses, incluindo o retorno de centenas de milhares de pessoas deslocadas internamente para suas casas.

No entanto, a FIB não conseguiu criar um ambiente no qual a população civil se sentisse segura para voltar para casa. Com relação a esse aspecto, a ONU (2020) considera a diminuição do número de

deslocados internos como um indicador-chave de PoC capaz de medir a sensação de segurança da população local. Assim, a redução do número de deslocados internos significa que a população civil se sente menos vulnerável à violência. O gráfico abaixo mostra o número total de deslocados internos entre 2012 e 2020, considerando apenas a província de Kivu do Norte, onde a FIB foi implantada desde 2013:




Fonte: os autores (adaptado de <https://reliefweb.int>)

Figura 1: População de deslocados internos de Kivu do Norte

Entre 2012 e 2020, o número total de deslocados internos em Kivu do Norte atingiu seu nível mais baixo em 2016, o quarto ano após a implementação do FIB. No entanto, o número de deslocados internos cresceu 91,2% entre 2016 e 2020, o que corresponde ao nível mais alto em todo o período. Portanto, com base no número de deslocados internos na região de Kivu do Norte, não é possível afirmar que a vulnerabilidade da população local tenha sido reduzida pela implementação da FIB.

No Sudão do Sul, as principais tarefas da RPF relacionadas às operações de segurança foram o patrulhamento ativo para garantir a movimentação segura e livre para dentro, fora e nos arredores de Juba, incluindo a entrada e saída de estradas e das principais linhas de comunicação e transporte; a proteção do Aeroporto Internacional de Juba e a garantia de que ele permanecesse operacional; e a proteção das principais instalações em Juba que eram essenciais para o bem-estar da população local (ONU, 2019c). A Resolução 225/2019 também determinou que a RPF utilizasse todos os meios necessários para impedir a violência contra civis, especialmente a população vulnerável estabelecida nos PoC sites (ONU, 2019c). O gráfico a

seguir mostra a população de deslocados internos que vive nos PoC sites em Juba desde a criação da RPF em 2016:



Fonte: os autores (adaptado de <https://unmiss.unmissions.org>).

Figura 2: População dos PoC sites de Juba

Em Juba, a população dos PoC *sites* atingiu seu pico em 2016 devido à crise de Juba. Depois, houve uma ligeira diminuição de 1,1% na população dos PoC *sites* entre 2016 e 2017. Embora a RPF tenha sido criada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas em 2016, somente em meados de 2017 suas tropas começaram a ser enviadas para o Sudão do Sul, o que explica a pequena melhora neste ano. No início de 2018, a força de intervenção tinha cerca de 600 soldados posicionados no Sudão do Sul, em sua maioria escalões avançados de suas futuras unidades (ONU, 2018). No entanto, a chegada das tropas ajudou a reduzir a população dos PoC *sites* em 16,48%. Em 2019, foi possível medir com mais precisão os efeitos da RPF em Juba, já que a força de intervenção conseguiu desdobrar totalmente 2 batalhões e 2 companhias, chegando a aproximadamente 1.800 soldados. Além disso, um batalhão extra da China foi transferido do Setor Sul para o Setor Juba, reforçando a RPF (ONU, 2019d). De modo geral, o impacto da RPF em Juba resultou em uma diminuição significativa da população dos PoC *sites* de cerca de 23,3% entre 2017 e 2019. Entretanto, em 2020, houve um leve crescimento na população dos PoC *sites* de 0,6%, indicando um possível fim de um ciclo de melhoria, assim como em Kivu do Norte.

Portanto, o desdobramento da FIB em Kivu do Norte e da RPF em Juba resultaram em uma diminuição inicial da população de deslocados internos, o que indica que o aumento das operações de segurança e das capacidades de dissuasão pode estar associado à redução da vulnerabilidade da população. No entanto, foi possível verificar que a sensação de segurança criada pelo envio das forças de intervenção tende a desaparecer com o passar dos anos, levantando

dúvidas sobre a eficácia dessas brigadas para reduzir a vulnerabilidade a longo prazo.

b) Neutralização de grupos armados violentos

As operações de paz das Nações Unidas são geralmente o único ator internacional capaz de desempenhar um papel direto na proteção de civis contra a violência física (ONU, 2012). Por esse motivo, as operações de paz enviadas com mandatos de PoC recebem autorização para usar todos os meios necessários, inclusive o uso de força letal, para proteger os civis sob ameaça (ONU, 2020). Assim, a redução das ameaças existentes complementa a redução da vulnerabilidade, melhorando o PoC no curto prazo.


A FIB foi a primeira tropa da ONU a receber a tarefa de engajar diretamente os agressores do acordo de paz. A Resolução 2277 (2016) atribuiu à FIB a responsabilidade de impedir a expansão de todos os grupos armados, neutralizá-los e desarmá-los a fim de reduzir a ameaça representada por esses grupos à autoridade do Estado e à segurança no leste da RDC, abrindo espaço para atividades de estabilização (ONU, 2016c). Nesse contexto, a Resolução 2277 (2016) atribuiu à FIB a tarefa de conduzir operações ofensivas robustas altamente móveis e versáteis, com base na coleta e análise de informações, além de mitigar os riscos para os civis antes, durante e depois de cada operação militar. Essas operações deveriam ser realizadas unilateralmente ou em conjunto com as FARDC.

Assim como foi implementada em Goma, a FIB deu um ultimato de 48 horas para que as forças rebeldes da área se desarmassem. Namangale (2014) destaca as vitórias substanciais da FIB, que conseguiu derrotar o poderoso grupo rebelde M23 em cidades como Kibumba, Rumangabo e Rutshuru em apenas

quatro dias, de 25 a 28 de outubro de 2013. A atitude da FIB trouxe um senso de confiança para a população local, pois ninguém havia previsto uma derrota tão rápida dos rebeldes. Em novembro de 2013, a rendição total do M23 funcionou como uma validação importante para a Brigada de Intervenção (Sheeran & Case, 2014). Desde então, a FIB vem realizando operações ofensivas contra os grupos armados existentes, empregando uma gama completa de recursos.

Os principais resultados do FIB nos primeiros dezesseis meses, em relação à neutralização dos

grupos armados, foram a derrota completa do M-23; a redução do ADF a um número insignificante; a rendição de aproximadamente 4.000 combatentes rebeldes de diferentes grupos armados; e o desarmamento voluntário do FDLR (Nduwimana, 2014). De acordo com Mutisi (2014), a melhora evidente da situação na República Democrática do Congo após a implementação da FIB foi encorajadora em um primeiro momento, como mostra o gráfico abaixo:




Fonte: os autores (adaptado do Banco de Dados de Conflitos de Uppsala).

Figura 3: Mortes violentas na região de Kivu Norte

O gráfico demonstra uma redução relevante nas mortes violentas (como resultado de ataques de grupos armados) na região de Kivu do Norte a partir de 2014. Esse período também corresponde à implementação da FIB na mesma área. Portanto, há uma indicação de que o aumento das operações de segurança e dissuasão, bem como a neutralização de grupos armados pela FIB, resultaram em uma diminuição dos ataques mortais contra civis. No entanto, quatro anos após a implementação do FIB, houve um aumento significativo de mortes violentas em Kivu do Norte, que permaneceu persistente nos anos seguintes. Entre 2015 e 2020, o número de mortes violentas aumentou drasticamente em 302%.

No Sudão do Sul, de todas as atividades listadas em seu mandato, uma das principais tarefas da RPF era engajar qualquer ator que, de forma confirmada, estivesse preparando ataques ou se engajando em ataques contra PoC sites, instalações da ONU, pessoal da ONU, agentes humanitários ou civis (ONU, 2016b). Conforme descrito acima, a neutralização de grupos armados violentos era uma responsabilidade fundamental da RPF. Assim, além de

diminuir a vulnerabilidade da população civil por meio do controle das estradas e de infraestrutura crítica, esperava-se que a missão reduzisse as ameaças existentes por meio do engajamento direto delas. O gráfico a seguir mostra o cenário de Juba com relação a mortes violentas como resultado de ataques de grupos armados:



Fonte: os autores (adaptado do Banco de Dados de Conflitos de Uppsala).

Figura 4: Mortes violentas em Juba


Em Juba, as mortes violentas caíram para números muito baixos entre 2017 e 2018. No entanto, mesmo que os números ainda fossem pequenos, em 2019 houve um aumento preocupante de mortes violentas em comparação com 2018. Além disso, diferentemente do cenário na RDC, em que houve uma cooperação consistente entre a FIB e as FARDC, no Sudão do Sul a RPF enfrentou um grande desafio. Superada em número pelos principais grupos armados e privada de seus recursos aéreos, como helicópteros de ataque e veículos aéreos não tripulados, a RPF ficou muito enfraquecida e dependente das capacidades de suas forças especiais para enfrentar as principais ameaças contra civis. Além disso, a falta de meios adequados para fornecer transporte aéreo, apoio aéreo aproximado e evacuação de feridos (CASEVAC) limitou a mobilidade e o alcance da RPF. Apesar disso, o envio dessa força de intervenção conseguiu evitar um número caótico de mortes de civis como em 2016.

c) Desenvolvimento de forças locais

Um terceiro parâmetro de PoC a ser considerado nesta pesquisa é a criação de capacidade local por meio do desenvolvimento de forças de defesa/segurança. Uma vez que cria condições favoráveis para que um país melhore seus mecanismos de proteção de civis, o desenvolvimento de forças locais é uma estratégia essencial de longo prazo para a estabilização de uma zona de conflito. Nesse contexto, tanto a FIB quanto a RPF podiam contar com suas unidades de forças especiais. De acordo com a ONU (2015), as forças especiais da ONU oferecem a capacidade adequada para treinar as forças armadas de um país anfitrião e orientar as unidades locais por meio de direção e orientação para planejar, preparar e conduzir operações.

Yoho et al. (2014) reitera a importância de desenvolver e treinar as forças da nação anfitriã. Além de compreender melhor as ameaças, o ambiente operacional local e a população, as forças da nação anfitriã podem prever em melhores condições os efeitos colaterais de uma operação militar. Portanto, as forças locais devem estar preparadas para assumir a liderança.

Na RDC, a FIB desempenhou um papel fundamental no fortalecimento da capacidade dos agentes de segurança, em especial das FARDC (Mutisi, 2014). Além disso, em 2013, a vitória significativa da FIB contra o M-23, apoiada pelo exército congolês, ajudou a mudar a imagem das FARDC. Em vez de um exército conhecido por suas violações de direitos humanos e baixa eficiência, as FARDC provaram ser capazes de lutar por seu país. Esse evento também enviou uma mensagem importante a outros grupos rebeldes para que parassem de lutar, aumentando as esperanças de uma paz duradoura (Nduwimana 2014). O gráfico abaixo mostra as mortes de civis associadas às ações das FARDC:




Fonte: os autores (adaptado do Banco de Dados de Conflitos de Uppsala).

Figura 5: Mortes por forças estatais na região de Kivu do Norte

Os números acima retratam uma importante mudança no comportamento das FARDC após a implantação da FIB na região de Kivu do Norte. Treinadas e orientadas pela Brigada de Intervenção da ONU, as forças locais reduziram consideravelmente seus ataques à população civil desde 2014. No entanto, assim como ocorre com os outros indicadores do PoC, após cerca de quatro anos de implantação, houve um aumento consistente no número de mortes causadas pelas forças do Estado. A esse respeito, entre 2015 e 2020, as mortes por forças do Estado aumentaram 296%.

complexo, profundo e controverso, uma vez que o SPLA/SSPDF é responsável por constantes violações dos direitos humanos. Isso também envolve o engajamento político com o governo do Sudão do Sul, que precisa impedir que o SPLA/SSPDF cometa essas violações imediatamente. Como aspecto positivo, ter uma brigada especializada trabalhando de perto com o SPLA/SSPDF certamente poderia mudar seu comportamento e impedir grandes hostilidades contra os civis.

Considerando o contexto do Sudão do Sul, o desenvolvimento de forças locais é um trabalho



Fonte: os autores (adaptado do Banco de Dados de Conflitos de Uppsala).

Figura 6: Mortes pelas forças do Estado em Juba

Após o conflito de 2016, as mortes pelas forças do Estado em Juba foram reduzidas a zero em 2017, o que representa uma conquista significativa. No entanto, esse número voltou a aumentar entre 2017 e 2019. Como uma observação positiva, o número de mortes violentas pelas forças do Estado permaneceu baixo, chegando a 19 mortes em 2019 e reduzindo para 13 em 2020. Assim, o desdobramento da RPF conseguiu conter os principais ataques do SPLA/SSPDF contra a população civil em Juba, abrindo espaço para maior cooperação com essas forças locais.

d) *Síntese da comparação e recomendações*

A comparação entre a FIB implementada na RDC e a RPF desdobrada no Sudão do Sul indica muitas semelhanças, embora os diferentes ambientes operacionais imponham adaptações específicas de ambas as forças. Além disso, ao analisar os números associados à PoC (população de deslocados internos, mortes violentas como resultado de ataques de grupos armados e mortes pelas forças do Estado), é possível encontrar tendências e padrões perceptíveis para o emprego de brigadas/forças de intervenção em operações de paz da ONU.

Com relação à redução da vulnerabilidade, esta pesquisa demonstrou que a FIB e a RPF criaram uma sensação inicial de segurança, que tende a se dissipar com o tempo. Nesse contexto, o aumento das operações de segurança e dos meios de dissuasão foram eficazes para reduzir drasticamente o número de mortes violentas de civis por grupos armados. Entretanto, essa queda relevante não foi suficiente para incentivar a população de deslocados internos a voltar para casa.

Com relação à redução de ameaças, a FIB foi muito eficaz, principalmente durante os três primeiros anos de implantação em Kivu do Norte. Nesse sentido, ameaças importantes como o M23, a ADF e a FDLR sofreram grandes derrotas, criando certa estabilidade no leste do Congo. Após esse período, as mortes violentas por grupos armados aumentaram consideravelmente, o que mostra que os atores violentos também se adaptaram à presença da Brigada de Intervenção. O mesmo aconteceu com a RPF, que conseguiu reduzir drasticamente as mortes violentas por grupos armados em 2017 e 2018. No entanto, o aumento em 2019 indica que as mortes violentas provavelmente retornarão no longo prazo.

Com relação ao desenvolvimento das forças locais, por meio de treinamento, orientação e realização de operações conjuntas com as FARDC, a FIB conseguiu conter seu comportamento violento, especialmente durante os seus três primeiros anos de desdobramento na região de Kivu do Norte. Assim como os outros dois parâmetros, após esse período, as FARDC pioraram seu comportamento, aumentando seus ataques a civis. Com relação à RPF, assim como a

FIB, após cerca de três anos de níveis mais baixos, em 2019 o número de mortes por forças estatais apresentou uma tendência de aumento.

Portanto, a partir da comparação entre os dois estudos de caso, é possível identificar padrões e projetar algumas recomendações para forças de intervenção nível brigada. Essas recomendações também se baseiam nos fundamentos da Teoria da Complexidade. Nesse sentido, ambos os conflitos são considerados sistemas adaptativos complexos, capazes de se adaptar por meio de aprendizado ou evolução. Assim, é importante ter em mente que a implementação de um mecanismo de intervenção como a FIB ou a RPF cria uma sensação de segurança que pode se dissipar com o tempo. Por esse motivo, é essencial aproveitar essa janela de estabilidade para atingir objetivos estratégicos, contribuindo para uma paz duradoura.

Além disso, assim como em um sistema adaptativo complexo, os atores violentos são capazes de se adaptar à força de intervenção desdobrada em uma zona de conflito após certo tempo. Diante desse fenômeno, é necessário proceder com avaliações constantes do ambiente operacional, reconsiderando as prioridades das forças de intervenção de acordo com o surgimento de novas ameaças.

Como terceira recomendação, é imperativo que as forças de intervenção se envolvam com as forças de defesa locais, especialmente por meio de sua unidade de forças especiais. Ao trabalhar efetivamente com as forças locais, concentrando-se no respeito aos direitos humanos e na proteção de civis, as forças de intervenção têm o potencial de profissionalizar esses exércitos nacionais e mudar seu comportamento violento.

Por fim, em conformidade com a Teoria da Complexidade, os resultados deste estudo não pretendem representar uma verdade absoluta e perene. Pelo contrário, elas ajudam a criar um quadro holístico e a identificar padrões e tendências contemporâneos associados ao emprego de forças de intervenção de nível brigada em operações de paz robustas da ONU.

V. CONCLUSÕES

Esta pesquisa verificou que a UNMISS foi criada em 2011 para fornecer ao Sudão do Sul as condições necessárias para a estabilização e o desenvolvimento. No entanto, após o início do conflito em 2013, o mandato da Missão foi reorientado para a proteção de civis, de acordo com o Capítulo VII da Carta da ONU. Esse novo e robusto mandato provou ser insuficiente para acabar com o conflito no país. Em julho de 2016, violentos combates tomaram conta da capital, Juba, e a UNMISS, quase paralisada em suas ações, observou centenas de civis serem vítimas de atrocidades fora de seus complexos. Como resultado, o

Conselho de Segurança da ONU aumentou o número de militares em 4.000 e criou a Força de Proteção Regional.

A estrutura e o mandato da RPF foram baseados na Brigada de Intervenção da MONUSCO, desdobrada desde 2013 na República Democrática do Congo. Embora o ambiente operacional em Juba seja diferente do ambiente no leste do Congo, é possível reconhecer muitas semelhanças entre as duas forças de intervenção. Assim, entendendo que cada zona de conflito tem sua própria dinâmica, esta pesquisa foi capaz de identificar padrões e tendências comuns entre a FIB e a RPF, conforme esperado de acordo com a Teoria da Complexidade.

Portanto, este estudo elaborou a seguinte pergunta de pesquisa: com base nos resultados obtidos pela Brigada de Intervenção na República Democrática do Congo e pela Força de Proteção Regional no Sudão do Sul, qual foi o impacto das forças de intervenção nível brigada na proteção de civis?

Como resultado, este documento verificou que a FIB teve um impacto inicial positivo na PoC na região de Kivu do Norte, reduzindo a vulnerabilidade e as ameaças existentes, bem como melhorando o comportamento e o desempenho das forças locais. Entretanto, quatro anos após a implementação da FIB, indicadores como a quantidade de deslocados internos, o número de mortes violentas e o número de mortes pelas forças do Estado pioraram, mostrando que os efeitos positivos relacionados à implementação de uma força de intervenção tendem a se dissipar com o tempo. Em Juba, assim como na região de Kivu do Norte, a implementação da RPF gerou efeitos positivos nesses mesmos indicadores nos primeiros três anos de implantação. Entretanto, os indicadores também mostraram uma tendência de piora após esse período.

Esses resultados estão de acordo com a Teoria da Complexidade, que afirma que os sistemas adaptativos complexos, como os conflitos na RDC e no Sudão do Sul, são capazes de aprender e evoluir para se ajustar à pressão adicional representada pela implementação da FIB ou da RPF. Por esse motivo, para maximizar o impacto das forças de intervenção na proteção dos civis, é importante aproveitar o momento para implementar objetivos estratégicos, construindo as bases para uma paz duradoura. Além disso, considerando que os atores violentos também se adaptarão às forças de intervenção ao longo do tempo, reavaliações constantes do cenário e o desenvolvimento de novas estratégias são fundamentais para o sucesso da Missão. Além disso, como uma solução de longo prazo, as forças de intervenção precisam se envolver com as forças de defesa locais por meio de treinamento, orientação e cooperação, implementando medidas de direitos humanos e mudando seu comportamento violento.

Por fim, este estudo não esgota o conhecimento sobre o papel das forças de intervenção de nível brigada nas operações de paz da ONU. Nesse sentido, embora a RPF tenha sido absorvida pelo Setor Juba da UNMISS e perdido a maior parte de seu caráter, a FIB continua ativa na região de Kivu do Norte. Portanto, pesquisas futuras sobre o desempenho e o impacto da FIB na proteção de civis a partir de 2021 complementariam este estudo de forma eficiente.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

1. Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip. (2014). Explaining the (Il)legality of Uganda's Intervention in the Current South Sudan Conflict. *African Security Review* 23(4): 352-369. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2014.951063>
2. Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip. (2015). IGAD's Mediation in the Current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and Challenges. *African Security* 8(2): 120-145. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2015.1036671>
3. Beljan, Robert. (2014). Why Counterinsurgency Matters for MONUSCO? *Small Wars Journal*. <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/why-counterinsurgency-matters-for-monusco>
4. Bousquet, Antoine, & Curtis, Simon. (2011). Beyond Models and Metaphors: Complexity Theory, Systems Thinking and International Relations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 24 (1): 43-62. DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2011.558054
5. Copnall, James. (2014). *A Poisonous Thorn in our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and Incomplete Divorce*. C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.
6. Couture, M. 2007. Complexity and Chaos – State-of-the-Art; Overview of theoretical concepts. *Defence R&D Canada*. DRDC Valcartier.
7. Day, Adam, Gorur, Aditi, Holt, Victoria, & Hunt, Charles T. (2020). *The Political Practice of Peacekeeping: How Strategies for Peace Operations are Developed and Implemented*. United Nations University.
8. De Coning, Cedric. (2021). A critical year ahead for the UN Mission in South Sudan. *The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes*. <https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/a-critical-year-ahead-for-the-un-mission-in-south-sudan>.
9. Doss, Alan. (2014). In the Footsteps of Dr. Bunche: The Congo, UN Peacekeeping, and the Use of Force. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37(5): 703-735. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.908284>
10. Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON). (2019a). *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
11. Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON). (2019b). *Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in the DRC*. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

12. Fabricius, Peter. (2020) Asking the right questions about the Force Intervention Brigade. *Institute for Security Studies (ISS Today)*. <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/asking-the-right-questions-about-the-force-intervention-brigade>.
13. Hunt, Charles. (2017). All Necessary Means to What End? The Unintended Consequences of the "Robust Turn" in UN Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping* 24(1): 108-131. doi=10.1080/13533312.2016.1214074
14. International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP). (2015). *An Indispensable Protection Tool? Assessing the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC*. <https://icrtopblog.org/2015/01/16/an-indispensable-protection-tool-assessing-the-force-intervention-brigade-in-the-drc/>
15. International Peace Institute (IPI). (2019). *Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates: The Case of UNMISS*. <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/02/prioritizing-and-sequencing-peacekeeping-mandates-the-case-of-unmiss>
16. Jervis, Robert. (1997). Complex Systems: The Role of Interactions. In Albets, David, & Czerwinski, Thomas ((Eds.), *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*. National Defense University.
17. Lilly, Damian. (2012). The Changing Nature of the Protection of Civilians in International Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping* 19(5): 628-639. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533312.2012.722003>
18. Lilly, Damian. (2014). *Protection of Civilian Sites: a New Type of Displacement Settle?* <http://odihpn.org/magazine/protection-of-civilians-sites-a-new-type-of-displacement-settlement/>
19. Lyman, Princeton N. (2013). Sudan–South Sudan: The Unfinished Tasks. *American Foreign Policy Interests* 35(6): 333-338. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.855568>
20. Mitchell, Melanie. (2009) *Complexity: A Guided Tour*. Oxford University Press.
21. Müller, Lars. (2015). The Force Intervention Brigade: The United Nations Forces Beyond the Fine Line Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement. *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* 20(3): 359-380. <https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article-abstract/20/3/359/2357654>
22. Mutisi, Martha. (2014). Redefining Peacekeeping: The Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo. *The Social Science Research Council*. <http://forums.ssrc.org/kujenga-amani/2015/07/26/defining-peacekeeping-the-force-intervention-brigade-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/#.WKArPVW97IU>
23. Namangale, Clement. (2014). Dynamics of Conflict Management in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *PRISM Security Studies Journal* 5, (2): 73-83. https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-2/PRISM5-2_Dynamics_of_Conflict_Mgmt.pdf
24. Nduwimana, Donatien. (2014). Impact of the UN Force Intervention Brigade Operations on the Eastern DRC. *International Peace Support Training Center*. http://www.ipstc.org/media/documents/IPS_TCOPTNo2.pdf
25. Phayal, Anup, Khadka, Prabin B., & Thyne, Cayton L. (2015). What Makes an Ex-Combatant Happy? A Micro-Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in South Sudan. *International Studies Quarterly* 59(4): 654-668. Accessed February 8, 2017. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43869050>.
26. Pendle, Naomi. (2014). Interrupting the balance: reconsidering the complexities of conflict in South Sudan. *Disasters* 38, (2): 227-248. DOI: 10.1111/disa.12055
27. Prodanov, Cleber, & Freitas, Hernani. (2013). *Metodologia do Trabalho Acadêmico: Métodos e Técnicas da Pesquisa e do Trabalho Acadêmico* (2nd ed.). Editora Feevale.
28. Radio Tamazuj. (2016, August 14). *Battle in Juba: 8 Questions for Confused Observers*. https://radiotamazuj.org/en/article/battle-juba-8-questions-confused-observers?utm_source=Viber&utm_medium=Chat&utm_campaign=Private.
29. Radon, Jenik, & Logan, Sarah. (2014). South Sudan: Governance Arrangements, War, and Peace. *Journal of International Affairs* 68, (1): 149-167. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24461710>
30. Raghavan, Sudarsan. (2013, November 2). In Volatile Congo, a New UN Force with Teeth. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/in-volatile-congo-a-new-un-force-with-teeth/2013/11/01/0cda650c-423f-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2f9831d99397
31. Richardson, Kurt, & Cilliers, Paul. (2001). What is Complexity Science? A View from Different Directions. *Emergence* 3(1): 5-23. DOI: 10.1207/S15327000EM0301_02.
32. Rosenau, James. (1997). Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs. In Albets, David, & Czerwinski, Thomas (Eds.), *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*. National Defense University.
33. Rossi, Christopher R. (2016). The International Community, South Sudan, and the Responsibility to Protect. *New York University Journal of International Law & Politics* 49(1): 129-180. https://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/49NYUJILP129_ROSSI.pdf
34. Savas-Cazala, Menent. (2016). Offensive Use of Force in Peace Operations: The Force Intervention Brigade. *European Studies of Interdisciplinary Studies* 4, (2): 116-123. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298173>

35. Schmitt, John. (1997). Command and (out of) Control: the military implications of Complexity Theory. In Albets, David, & Czerwinski, Thomas (Eds.), *Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security*. National Defense University.
36. Sheeran, Scott, & Case, Stephanie. (2014). The Intervention Brigade. Legal Issues for the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *International Peace Institute*. https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_legal_issues_drc_brigade.pdf
37. Silva, Josias. (2018). Alternative Strategy to the Conflict in the Central African Republic: The Establishment of a Permanent African Peacekeeping Force. *Revista Brasileira de Estudos Africanos* 3(6): 9-22. <https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:8yqQGCyn7q8J:https://seer.ufrgs.br/rbea/article/download/86789/52362+%&cd=2&hl=pt-BR&ct=clnk&gl=br&client=safari>
38. Silva, Josias. (2019). The Contribution of the United Nations Police to the Protection of Civilians in South Sudan. *Conjuntura Austral* 10(50): 88-101. DOI: 10.22456/2178-8839.93332.
39. Silva, Josias. (2021). Teoria da Complexidade: Uma Nova Opção Epistemológica para as Ciências Militares? *Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa* 8(1): 13-36. <https://rbed.abedef.org/rbed/article/view/75234>
40. Tull, Denis M. (2013). When They Overstay their Welcome: UN Peacekeepers in Africa. *Journal of International Peacekeeping* (17): 179-200. <https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/un-peacekeepers-in-africa>
41. Tull, Denis M. (2018). The Limits and Unintended Consequences of UN Peace Enforcement: The Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo. *International Peacekeeping* 25(2): 167-190. DOI: 10.1080/13533312.2017.1360139
42. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2012). *Protection of Civilians*. (Peace Operations Training Institute). Department of Peace Operations.
43. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2013). *Resolution 2098 (2013)*. United Nations Security Council.
44. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2015). *United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces Manual*. Department of Peace Operations.
45. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2016a). Adopting Resolution 2304 (2016), Security Council Extends Mission in South Sudan, Authorizes Expanded Peacekeeping Force to Bolster Civilian Protection Efforts. *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12475.doc.htm>.
46. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2016b). Adopting Resolution 2327 (2016), Security Council Grants Mandate Extension of United Nations Mission in South Sudan, Considers Possible Sanctions. *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12634.doc.htm>.
47. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2016c). Security Council Authorizes Mandate Renewal for United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo. *Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12307.doc.htm>.
48. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2018). UNMISS. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNMISS>
49. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2019a). *United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml>.
50. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2019b). *Resolution 2502 (2019)*. United Nations Security Council.
51. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2019c). *Resolution 225 (2019)*. United Nations Security Council.
52. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2019d). UNMISS. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNMISS>
53. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2020). *The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping*. Department of Peace Operations.
54. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2021a). <https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/unmiss-deployment-map-june-2021>
55. Organização das Nações Unidas (ONU). (2021b). *Resolution 2567 (2021)*. United Nations Security Council.
56. Warner, Lesley A. (2016). The Disintegration of the Military Integration Process in South Sudan (2006-2013). *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 5(12): 1-20. <https://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.460/>
57. Whittle, Devon. (2015). Peacekeeping in Conflict: The Intervention Brigade, MONUSCO, and the Application of International Humanitarian Law to the United Nations Forces. *Law and Policy in International Business* 46, (3). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/277570849_Peacekeeping_in_Conflict_The_Intervention_Brigade_MONUSCO_and_the_Application_of_International_Humanitarian_Law_to_the_United_Nations_Forces
58. Wondemagegnehu, Dawit. (2020). *Peacekeeping in a Difficult Neighborhood: The case of South Sudan*. The London School of Economics and Political Science.
59. Yin, Robert K. (2001). *Estudo de Caso: planejamento e métodos* (2nd ed.). Bookman.

60. Yoho, Keenan D., deBlanc-Knowles, Tess, & Borum, Randy. (2014). The Global SOF Network: Posturing Special Operations Forces to Ensure Global Security in the 21st Century. *Journal of Strategic Security* 7(2): 1-7. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465180?seq=1>





This page is intentionally left blank



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 24 Issue 1 Version 1.0 Year 2024
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Unveiling Disparities: Investigating the Gap between Palestinian Authority Counter Segregation Policies and Local Implementation Amid Deteriorating Conditions in the West Bank

By Mohammed Itair & Huda Armoush

Abstract- Spatial segregation in the West Bank remains a pressing issue with profound social, economic, and political implications. This study examines the gap between the Palestinian Authority's (PA) political statements and the local implementation of strategic planning measures to counter segregation in Palestinian communities. By analyzing the Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs) from 2018-2021, this research investigates the extent to which these plans address the challenges posed by Israeli settlements and promote inclusive urban development. The findings reveal significant shortcomings, including limited coverage of settlement-related challenges, inadequate strategies to confront settlement activity, and a lack of context-specific approaches; Out of the 122 plans analyzed, only 15 (12.3%) explicitly addressed the geopolitical situation, while 67 (54.9%) acknowledged settlements as a challenge. Disturbingly, 28 plans (22.9%) neglected the significance of Area C, highlighting a substantial oversight.

Keywords: *anti-segregation measures, strategic planning, planning under occupation, context-specific planning, policies gap, area c in the west bank.*

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 160403



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



© 2024. Mohammed Itair & Huda Armoush. This research/review article is distributed under the terms of the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). You must give appropriate credit to authors and reference this article if parts of the article are reproduced in any manner. Applicable licensing terms are at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

Unveiling Disparities: Investigating the Gap between Palestinian Authority Counter Segregation Policies and Local Implementation Amid Deteriorating Conditions in the West Bank

Mohammed Itair^α & Huda Armoush^ο

Abstract- Spatial segregation in the West Bank remains a pressing issue with profound social, economic, and political implications. This study examines the gap between the Palestinian Authority's (PA) political statements and the local implementation of strategic planning measures to counter segregation in Palestinian communities. By analyzing the Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs) from 2018-2021, this research investigates the extent to which these plans address the challenges posed by Israeli settlements and promote inclusive urban development. The findings reveal significant shortcomings, including limited coverage of settlement-related challenges, inadequate strategies to confront settlement activity, and a lack of context-specific approaches; Out of the 122 plans analyzed, only 15 (12.3%) explicitly addressed the geopolitical situation, while 67 (54.9%) acknowledged settlements as a challenge. Disturbingly, 28 plans (22.9%) neglected the significance of Area C, highlighting a substantial oversight. Additionally, 35 plans (28.7%) considered Area C as inaccessible for development, revealing an approach contrary to the official statements of the PA. The absence of a clear vision for Area C and insufficient proposals for expansion and development exacerbate the issue. To effectively address spatial segregation, the PA must prioritize social and economic resilience, formulate comprehensive strategic plans, and enhance coordination between political statements and local planning practices. This research underscores the urgency of integrated counter-segregation measures, emphasizing the importance of context-specific approaches and increased collaboration among stakeholders, particularly in the coming SDIPs. By bridging the gap between political statements and local implementation, the PA can take tangible steps toward equitable, sustainable, and resilient spatial planning in the West Bank. The methodology implemented in this research extends beyond spatial segregation in the West Bank, providing a practical strategy to assess policy gaps in diverse situations, particularly under uncertainties and restrictions, offering valuable insights for policymakers and urban planners navigating complex challenges.

Keywords: anti-segregation measures, strategic planning, planning under occupation, context-specific planning, policies gap, area c in the west bank.

Author ^α: e-mails: mohammeditair@gmail.com,
huda.armosh@gmail.com

I. INTRODUCTION

The West Bank (WB) has been subjected to decades of Israeli occupation (*Human Rights Watch, 2017*), which has resulted in the displacement and fragmentation of Palestinian communities and the forced imposition of spatial segregation (*Samman, 2021; Shehadeh, 2017*). The spatial segregation imposed by the Israeli occupation has been extensively studied in the literature, and the impact of Israeli policies on Palestinian communities has been widely documented. However, there has been less attention given to the role of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in exacerbating the issue of spatial segregation and overlooking its role in addressing it in the WB (*Al-Omari, 2023*).

The challenges facing the PA in countering segregation in the WB are complex and multifaceted (*Braverman, 2021; Habbas & Berda, 2021*). While the Israeli occupation and its policies have played a significant role in creating the reality of spatial segregation in the WB (*Human Rights Council, 2022*), the PA must also take responsibility for addressing its institutional and policy shortcomings (*Rahman, 2019*).

The unfair and ill-conceived political commitments of the PA, such as the Oslo and Paris Accords (*Carlill, 2021; Turner, 2019*), the preservation of the floundering legal legacy (*Kohlbray, 2022*), and the absence of the legislative council (*Hamad et al., 2022*) are all factors, for which the PA is primarily responsible, have contributed either directly or not to the spatial segregation in the WB.

In our paper, we will shed light on one of the most important issues neglected while dealing with spatial segregation in the WB: the development of anti-segregation measures in the local planning system in the WB. The lack of these counter-policies in Palestinian cities and towns is a critical issue that needs to be addressed. Without effective spatial planning policies prioritizing social and economic resiliency, efforts to counter segregation and promote sustainable urban development will fall short.

So, this paper seeks to answer to what extent the strategic planning for Palestinian communities

addresses the issue of spatial segregation, and how the urban policies and political statements developed at the national level are linked or not to the local strategic and development planning. The paper focuses mainly on the policy shortcomings and on the extent to which there is consistency between national visions and local plans.

By analyzing all the Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs) for the Palestinian communities from 2018-2021, which are the most recent SDIPs, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the issue of spatial segregation in the WB from a different perspective and investigate the gap between PA political statements to counter segregation and the local practices in developing counter segregation measures.

Furthermore, our research highlights the need for integrated counter-segregation measures in the Palestinian spatial planning system and provides recommendations for policy and practice. The importance of this research lies in its potential to inform policy and practice toward more equitable, sustainable, and resilient spatial planning practices in the WB.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2: This section sheds light on the status quo of settlements in the WB and Israeli settlers' attacks on the Palestinian communities. On the other hand, section 3 presents the official position of the Palestinian leadership and its anti-settlement policies. Section 4 describes the methodology followed in investigating the gap between PA's counter-segregation policies and local planning anti-segregation measures. Section 5 shares the results and discussion. Finally, Section 6 concludes the key insights and outcomes from this study, and presents recommendations for future SDIPs.

II. THE STATUS QUO

Despite Spatial segregation being a widespread phenomenon that occurred or is still ongoing in many countries worldwide, the situation in Palestine is unique due to a combination of historical, political, and geographical factors.

Spatial segregation refers to the physical, economic, or social separation of different groups within a society, resulting in disparities in access to resources and opportunities (Enqvist & Ziervogel, 2019; He et al., 2022; Knorr, 2016). In the WB, spatial segregation is primarily a consequence of deeply rooted and decades-long Israeli occupation, which has resulted in the fragmentation of the Palestinian urban landscape (Yiftachel, 2023).

Persecuting Israeli policies, including settlement construction, land confiscation, and movement restrictions forced imposition of spatial segregation (Amnesty International, 2022b; Shakir, 2021). This has led to the creation of separate and unequal urban spaces that limit the access of Palestinians to basic

services (OCHA, 2017), such as water (Rudolph & Kurian, 2022), healthcare (Keelan, 2016), and employment opportunities (Weinthal & Sowers, 2019).

In the context of the West Bank, Areas A, B, and C play a crucial role in understanding the geopolitical dynamics and territorial control. As per the Oslo Accords, the West Bank is divided into three main areas: Area A, which is under full Palestinian civil and security control; Area B, where Palestinians have civil control and shared security control with Israel; and Area C, which remains under full Israeli civil and security control. The distribution of land in these areas has significant implications for Palestinian communities and their development prospects.

Area C, comprising approximately 60% of the West Bank's total land area, holds particular significance in terms of its potential for expansion and the implementation of development projects. Unfortunately, due to restrictions imposed by Israeli policies, Palestinian access to and development of Area C has been severely constrained.

The number of settlers in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, reached 850,000 individuals (About a fifth of the population of the West Bank) residing in 176 settlements and 186 outposts (Al-A'raj, 2020; Nofal, 2022). In addition, 13 new outposts were either established or legalized. The occupation government approved 83 plans to construct 8,288 new settlement units in the West Bank and 2,635 units in occupied Jerusalem during the same year. Additionally, the occupation authorities confiscated approximately 26,500 dunums of land using various methods such as declaring natural reserves, issuing expropriation and seizure orders, and classifying them as "state lands."

In 2021, the Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ) documented a total of 900 attacks perpetrated by settler groups in the WB (ARIJ, 2021). These attacks targeted various aspects of Palestinian life, including land, property, livestock, agricultural resources, and even Palestinian civilians. The incidents were distributed across different governorates, with Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron witnessing 233, 194, and 170 attacks, respectively. Simultaneously, Israeli settlers and the occupation army burned and destroyed more than 20,000 trees, with approximately 9,000 of them being fruitful olive trees.

Additionally, ARIJ revealed that the Israeli occupation authorities deposited 113 settlement plans in 62 Israeli settlements throughout 2021. These plans aimed to construct over 17,000 settlement units, covering an area exceeding 13,000 dunums (1 dunum = 1000 m²) of Palestinian land. The Jerusalem governorate was the most heavily targeted, with more than 6,300 dunums of Palestinian land earmarked for settlement expansion. Following Jerusalem, the

governorates of Ramallah and Bethlehem experienced significant land seizures, with 2,082 and 1,582 dunums, respectively, allocated for settlement construction. In conjunction with the systematic expansion of the settlements, Israel demolished 300 homes across the West Bank. The most impacted governorates in terms of demolitions were Jerusalem (89 houses), Tubas (73 houses), and Hebron (39 houses). Moreover, more than 450 establishments of various types fell victim to demolitions, with Jerusalem, Hebron, and Tubas bearing the brunt of these actions. The gravity of the situation was further evident in the forced displacement of over 600 Palestinians from the Jordan Valley. This marked an increase from the 278 Palestinians displaced from the region in 2020.

Moving into 2022, The number of settler attacks jumped to 1,187, including Israeli army participation in assaults on Palestinian cities and communities as well as direct attacks on citizens and their property (*Anadolu Agency, 2023*). Furthermore, the Israeli occupation authorities revealed their approval of settlement plans in several Israeli settlements in the West Bank (*ARIJ, 2022*). These plans predominantly concentrated in the central and northern regions, targeting nine Israeli settlements and encompassing 4,762 dunums of Palestinian land. Notably, 4,000 dunums were exclusively allocated to the expansion of the Modi'in Illit settlement, west of Ramallah, encroaching upon the lands of Deir Qaddis, Ni'lin, Bil'in, and Kharbatha.

These stark statistics underscore the persisting challenges faced by Palestinians as a result of Israeli aggression. The documented attacks, demolitions, settlement expansions, and forced displacements collectively paint a grim reality for Palestinians living under occupation, necessitating urgent attention and effective measures to address these violations of human rights and international law. At the same time, this reality requires the PA to implement effective spatial measures that are representative of its political statements and plans prepared at the national level. The strategic planning of the local communities is the real mirror of the official directions, and in the Palestinian case, it goes beyond that to be a matter of existence for the Palestinians. Therefore, it is very necessary that the strategic planning of the local authorities be carried out seriously, with high coordination and coherence.

In the following map, we present a visual depiction of the areas under Israeli control and influence in the West Bank, contrasting them with the areas under the influence of the Palestinian Authority. The map employs two distinct colors for clarity: green represents the areas under Palestinian control, all of which are part of Area A. Conversely, the red color illustrates Area C, along with regions where Israel has exerted control through various means such as forceful occupation, settlement expansion initiatives, or discrepancies in agreements with the Palestinian Authority.

Areas of Israeli Influence vs the Palestinian Authority's Influence in the West Bank




Figure 1: The Map of Israeli Influence Areas vs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank

Examining the map, it becomes evident that Israel maintains significant dominance over the West Bank. This reality stands in stark contrast to the

commonly depicted ABC areas in Figure No. 2, revealing a far more troubling situation than initially portrayed.




Figure 2: Area ABC in the West Bank. Ref (<https://www.welcometopalestine.com/article/areas-a-b-c-explained-west-bank-israel-gaza-palestine/>)

III. THE PA'S POLITICAL STATEMENTS TO COUNTER SPATIAL SEGREGATION IN THE WB

The Palestinian Authority has consistently emphasized its commitment to countering the fragmentation in the urban landscape in the West Bank through various political statements (*State of Palestine, 2021a; The White House, 2022*). Recognizing the detrimental effects of Israeli occupation and its policies on Palestinian communities (*Amnesty International, 2022a*), the PA has called for the promotion of inclusive and integrated urban development that fosters social cohesion and equitable access to resources (*Michelle, 2017; Palestinian Water Authority, 2016*).

In its political statements, the PA has stressed the importance of challenging the spatial segregation imposed by the Israeli occupation, which has resulted in the displacement and fragmentation of Palestinian communities (*Cammack et al., 2017*). PA has highlighted the need to address the forced imposition of spatial segregation that has hindered the natural growth and development of Palestinian cities and towns.

Furthermore, the PA has emphasized the significance of spatial planning policies that prioritize social and economic resilience, aiming to mitigate the negative impacts of segregation on Palestinian communities (*MoLG, 2020*). It has advocated for the formulation of comprehensive strategic plans that incorporate principles of inclusivity, sustainability, and equitable resource distribution (*Itair et al., 2022; State of Palestine, 2021b*). Concrete goals and principles outlined in the PA's political statements include promoting local economic activities including, agricultural activities in the Jordan Valley governorates. Additionally; the PA advocates for the expansion of master plans into Area C as a land internationally recognized Palestinian, Furthermore the PA emphasizes the pursuit of economic independence from the Israeli economy.

However, beyond the limitations imposed by the Israeli occupation, the extent to which local plans align with the PA's policies in addressing spatial segregation remains a question that requires investigation (*Arafeh, 2018*). It is important to objectively examine whether the local implementation of strategic plans effectively

reflects the PA's stated intentions in countering spatial segregation.

This research aims to explore the gap between the PA's policies and their local implementation in the West Bank. By analyzing the alignment between the PA's political statements and the actual measures taken at the local level, we seek to objectively assess the extent to which local plans meet the PA's objectives in countering spatial segregation. Through this investigation, we hope to gain insights into the challenges and potential opportunities for bridging the gap and improving the implementation of strategic plans in addressing spatial segregation in the West Bank.

IV. METHODOLOGY

Counter-segregation approaches in spatial planning worldwide involve a range of strategies and policies aimed at promoting social and economic integration and reducing spatial inequalities, for example: mixed-housing policies (Levin et al., 2022), transit-oriented development (Mueller et al., 2018), inclusionary zoning, participatory planning ... etc.

It is important to note that the effectiveness of these theories and approaches may vary depending on the context in which they are applied. For example, the application of participatory planning may be more challenging in contexts where there is political instability or conflict, as marginalized communities may be hesitant to engage in the planning process. Similarly, the

use of legal and policy tools may be constrained in contexts where there is limited political will or capacity to implement such measures. Therefore, a nuanced and context-specific approach is necessary when designing and implementing counter-segregation urban planning interventions.

Our paper investigates the extent to which Palestinian strategic development and investment plans in the West Bank address the geopolitical situation and the issue of Israeli settlements. We conducted a comprehensive review of these plans. Our study sought to examine whether the policies outlined by the PA in countering settlements and improving the resilience of Palestinian communities are effectively translated into local measures. Furthermore, we aimed to identify any context-specific approaches adopted in each plan.

a) Data Collection

The data collection process involved obtaining the most recent Strategic and Development Plans (SDIPs) for the period 2018-2021, which were conducted in 2017. These plans were obtained from the Ministry of Local Governance, which served as the primary source for accessing the relevant documentation.

There was a total of 122 SDIPs prepared in 2017 in the West Bank, and they are all represented on the map below. All these plans are addressed in this study. Table 1 shows their distribution among the governorates.





Figure 3: The map of most recent SDIPs in the West Bank

Table 1: The distribution of SDIPs among the governorates



b) Plans Analysis

During this step, each SDIP underwent a comprehensive analysis to evaluate its coverage of the geopolitical situation and Israeli settlements. This involved closely examining the plan's vision, strategies, and programs to determine the extent to which it addressed these critical aspects.

Additionally, we carefully assessed whether the consultants who conducted the plans followed context-specific approaches. This involved considering the unique political, social, and economic context of each municipality and determining if the plans were tailored to address the specific challenges and opportunities presented by the presence of Israeli settlements.

Furthermore, we investigated the effectiveness of the programs outlined in the plans in confronting settlement activity and addressing its repercussions. This included examining the proposed actions, initiatives, and measures aimed at mitigating the negative impacts of settlements on Palestinian communities.

Another aspect of the analysis focused on examining the plans' vision for Area C in the West Bank. Specifically, we explored whether the plans addressed the possibility of expansion or proposed projects in this region, which is under Israeli control. Understanding how the plans addressed the development potential and challenges in Area C provided valuable insights into their comprehensiveness and alignment with national objectives.

Finally, we examined whether the plans, both in their formulation and content, were consistent with the national policies set forth to confront Israeli settlements and promote the development of Area C. This involved assessing the level of alignment between the plans and the broader strategic directions and policies set by the PA to counteract settlement expansion and ensure sustainable development.

By conducting this comprehensive analysis, we aimed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the extent to which the SDIPs addressed the geopolitical situation, Israeli settlements, and the national policies aimed at confronting these challenges.

c) Identification of Gaps and Formulation of Recommendations

Through this step, areas were identified where the plans may require further attention to adequately address the challenges posed by settlements and align with national policies and objectives. To facilitate improvements, a set of recommendations and insights were formulated based on the analysis findings. These recommendations aim to enhance the effectiveness of future strategic planning efforts by emphasizing the integration of context-specific approaches, the prioritization of resiliency measures, and the alignment of local plans with national policies in addressing settlement activity and promoting sustainable development in the West Bank.

V. RESULTS & DISCUSSION

In this section, we present the findings of our analysis of 122 development plans for the West Bank. These plans were examined to evaluate their coverage of the geopolitical situation and Israeli settlements, as well as their consideration of key challenges and opportunities. The results shed light on various aspects of the plans and highlight areas that require attention and improvement.

a) Geopolitical Situation and Israeli Settlements

Out of the 122 analyzed plans, only 15 plans (12.3%) explicitly studied the geopolitical situation and its implications. Even these plans only briefly mentioned the effects of settlements on the various development sectors and statistics about attacks and losses. This

indicates a limited focus on understanding and addressing the complex dynamics at play in the region. Furthermore, 67 plans (54.9%) acknowledged the settlements as a challenge and problem, indicating an awareness of the socio-political realities on the ground, but this acknowledgment was not translated into any projects or visions in the strategic plan, and there was a complete isolation between the analysis stage and the vision-building and implementation stage. However, it is concerning that a significant portion of plans (28 plans, 22.9%) did not mention Area C as an area available for planning and disregarded their existence. This oversight neglects a crucial aspect of territorial planning and development of the PA.

b) *Area C Development*

In our analysis, we found that 35 plans (28.7%) considered Area C as inaccessible or unviable for development, while the remaining plans proposed simple projects in this area. It is worth noting that these projects were marked as threatened in the plan by Israeli authorities. This highlights the mindset of dealing with Area C. This, in turn, completely contradicts the Palestinian Authority's call for planning in Area C, and it also contradicts the idea that more than 45% of the lands of these strategic plans locate in Area C.

c) *Employment in Israel*

Regarding economic challenges, only 25 plans (20.5%) acknowledged the issue of Palestinian workers commuting to work in Israel as a significant problem that threaten the independency of the Palestinian economy. While 17 plans (13.9%) proposed small projects to confront this issue. It is evident that these initiatives jobs do not compensate for the opportunities offered by Israel. Additionally, a concerning finding is that 7 plans (5.7%) identified the decrease in the number of Israeli permits to work as an economic problem, which contradicts the Palestinian vision of achieving independence from Israel. The emphasis on employment in Israel raises questions about the alignment of these plans with broader national visions of the PA.

d) *Context-Specific Planning and Consultants' Influence*

One notable observation from our analysis is the lack of context-specific planning for cities within the West Bank. The majority of plans appeared to be influenced by a copy-and-paste approach, lacking consideration for local variations and specificities. For instance, one consultant responsible for implementing 26 projects across different regions of the West Bank demonstrated a striking lack of diversity in vision, as 15 of these projects shared identical goals. Similarly, another consultant involved in preparing 8 projects replicated plans without making any modifications, including changing the name or location. This lack of

contextualization undermines the effectiveness and relevance of the plans.

e) *Alternative Energy Generation*

A positive aspect emerged from our analysis, as a considerable number of plans (30 plans, 24.6%) highlighted the importance of alternative energy generation and the goal of achieving independence from Israeli suppliers. This reflects a growing recognition of the potential of renewable energy sources and their contribution to sustainable development in the West Bank.

f) *Limitations in Plan Preparation, Monitoring, and Approval*

Based on the findings, it is evident that there are shortcomings in the process of preparing, monitoring, and approving the analyzed plans. These deficiencies may stem from various factors such as inadequate resources, limited expertise, and challenges related to coordination and decision-making. Addressing these limitations is crucial to enhance the effectiveness and relevance of future development plans.

Examining the following map which depicts the intersection of Israeli influence with the areas covered by the SDIPs, it becomes abundantly clear that a more profound comprehension of the geopolitical situation is imperative in the strategic planning of Palestinian communities. The map vividly illustrates the extent of Israeli influence and its direct impact on the areas encompassed by the plans. The overlapping regions underscore the critical need to consider the geopolitical dynamics, including the presence of Israeli settlements and their implications, when formulating strategic plans. By acknowledging and incorporating this reality into the planning process, communities can better navigate the challenges and make informed decisions to ensure sustainable development and the resilience of Palestinian territories.



Israeli Influence Intersect with SDIPs Areas




Figure 4: The Map of Israeli Influence Intersect with SDIPs Areas

In conclusion, the analysis of the 122 development plans highlights several key areas that warrant attention and improvement. Firstly, there is a pressing need for a comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical situation, ensuring that the plans effectively navigate the complex dynamics. Additionally, addressing the challenges posed by Israeli settlements is of utmost importance, as they significantly impact the development and resilience of Palestinian communities. Proper consideration of Area C development is essential, recognizing its potential and overcoming the existing limitations imposed by legal and administrative constraints. Moreover, addressing economic problems, particularly the issue of employment in Israel, requires strategic initiatives to create more opportunities within the Palestinian territories. Lastly, fostering context-specific planning is crucial to ensure that each plan accounts for the unique characteristics and needs of the respective cities and regions. By addressing these areas, future development plans can be enhanced to better serve the Palestinian communities and promote resilient and sustainable growth.

VI. CONCLUSION

The issue of spatial segregation in the West Bank is a complex and multifaceted challenge that requires greater attention from the PA. While the Israeli

occupation and its policies have played a significant role in creating and perpetuating spatial segregation, the PA must also take responsibility for addressing its institutional and policy shortcomings. This research aimed to shed light on the gap between the PA's political statements and the local implementation of strategic planning measures to counter segregation in Palestinian communities.

The findings of this study revealed that while the PA has consistently emphasized its commitment to countering spatial segregation, there are significant challenges in translating these policies into effective local measures. The analysis of the Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs) for Palestinian communities from 2018-2021 showed a lack of comprehensive and context-specific approaches to address the issue of Israeli settlements and the geopolitical situation. Furthermore, the plans exhibited limited coverage of the challenges posed by Israeli settlements, inadequate strategies and programs to confront settlement activity, and insufficient consideration of the unique context of each municipality. The absence of a clear vision for Area C in the West Bank, along with the limited proposals for expansion and development in this region, also highlighted the need for more comprehensive and inclusive planning approaches.

To effectively counter spatial segregation and promote sustainable urban development, it is crucial for the PA to prioritize social and economic resilience in its spatial planning policies. This requires the formulation of comprehensive strategic plans that incorporate principles of inclusivity, sustainability, and equitable resource distribution. It also necessitates greater coordination and coherence between national-level political statements and local planning practices.

The implications of this research are significant as they underscore the urgent need for integrated counter-segregation measures in the Palestinian spatial planning system. By bridging the gap between political statements and local implementation, the PA can take tangible steps toward more equitable, sustainable, and resilient spatial planning practices in the West Bank.

In conclusion, this research goes beyond the specific issue of spatial segregation in the West Bank. It offers a practical strategy to assess policy gaps in different situations, especially when facing uncertainties and restrictions. The methods used provide valuable insights for policymakers and urban planners dealing with complex challenges.

By examining the Strategic Development and Investment Plans (SDIPs) from 2018-2021, our study not only points out deficiencies in the Palestinian Authority's counter-segregation efforts but also establishes a simple and adaptable method for similar investigations in other regions.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

- Al-A'raj. (2020). *April 7, 2020—PNN: Report: Settlements a major source of Corona outbreak in Palestine (By Madeeha Al-A'raj)*. [http://www.dci.plo.ps/en/article/14914/April-7,-2020---PNN-Report-Settlements-a-major-source-of-Corona-outbreak-in-Palestine-\(By-Madeeha-Al-A'raj\)](http://www.dci.plo.ps/en/article/14914/April-7,-2020---PNN-Report-Settlements-a-major-source-of-Corona-outbreak-in-Palestine-(By-Madeeha-Al-A'raj))
- Al-Omari, G. (2023, February 28). *To Prevent the PA from Unraveling, Address Internal Reform*. The Washington Institute. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/prevent-pa-unraveling-address-internal-reform>
- Amnesty International. (2022a). *Human rights in Israel and Occupied Palestinian Territories*. Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/>
- Amnesty International. (2022b, February 1). *Israel's apartheid against Palestinians*. Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2022/02/israels-system-of-apartheid/>
- Anadolu Agency. (2023, February 2). *Settlement in the West Bank. Numbers and attacks (الاستيطان في الضفة الغربية .. أرقام واعتداءات)*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84/-/D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-2023-%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1/2968751>
- Arafah, N. (2018). A Review of the "Strategic Sectorial Development Plan for Jerusalem (2018–. *Jerusalem Quarterly*, 76, 24–32.
- ARIJ. (2021, December 29). *The harvest of Israeli settlement in occupied Palestine during the year 2021 (2021 حصاد الاستيطان الاسرائيلي في فلسطين المحتلة خلال العام 2021)*. <http://poica.org/2021/12/%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B7%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7/>
- ARIJ. (2022, October 22). *At a rate of "4,762 dunums", the occupation authorities have approved a number of settlement plans since the beginning of October 2022 (بواقع "4,762 دونما"، سلطات الاحتلال تصادق على عدد من المخططات الاستيطانية منذ بداية شهر تشرين أول 2022)*. <http://poica.org/2022/10/%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-4762-%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%86%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%82-%D8%B9%D9%84/>
- Braverman, I. (2021). Environmental justice, settler colonialism, and more-than-humans in the occupied West Bank: An introduction. *Environment and Planning E: Nature and Space*, 4(1), 3–27. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2514848621995397>
- Cammack, P., Brown, N. J., & Muasher, M. (2017). *Revitalizing Palestinian Nationalism: Options Versus Realities*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/06/28/revitalizing-palestinian-nationalism-options-versus-realities-pub-71364>
- Carlill, B. (2021). The Wrong Peace Process? In B. Carlill (Ed.), *The Challenges of Resolving the Israeli–Palestinian Dispute: An Impossible Peace?* (pp. 253–278). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63185-7_17
- Enqvist, J. P., & Ziervogel, G. (2019). Water governance and justice in Cape Town: An overview. *WIREs Water*, 6(4), e1354. <https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1354>

13. Habbas, W., & Berda, Y. (2021). Colonial management as a social field: The Palestinian remaking of Israel's system of spatial control. *Current Sociology*, 00113921211024695. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00113921211024695>
14. Hamad, A. M. A., Indriyani, R., Ramadan, A. M. M. A., & Fitriano, R. A. (2022). Separation of Powers in the Palestinian Law: Does it Reflect the Democratic System? (A Comparative Approach with Indonesia). *Lex Scientia Law Review*, 6(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.15294/lesrev.v6i2.58038>
15. He, Q., Musterd, S., & Boterman, W. (2022). Understanding different levels of segregation in urban China: A comparative study among 21 cities in Guangdong province. *Urban Geography*, 43(7), 1036–1061. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02723638.2021.1893049>
16. Human Rights Council. (2022, April 27). *Israel's housing policies in occupied Palestinian territory amount to racial segregation—UN experts*. OHCHR. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/04/israels-housing-policies-occupied-palestinian-territory-amount-racial>
17. Human Rights Watch. (2017, June 4). Israel: 50 Years of Occupation Abuses. *Human Rights Watch*. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/04/israel-50-year-s-occupation-abuses>
18. Itair, M., Hijazi, I., Qanazi, S., Zaidalkilani, S., & Issa, A. (2022). Localizing sustainable development goals in strategic development planning procedures. Case study: Local development planning manual for the Palestinian cities and towns. *An-Najah University Journal for Research - B (Humanities)*, 37(8), None-None. <https://doi.org/10.35552/0247.37.8.2074>
19. Keelan, E. (2016). Medical Care in Palestine: Working in a Conflict Zone. *The Ulster Medical Journal*, 85(1), 3–7.
20. Knorr, L. (2016). Divided Landscape: The Visual Culture of Urban Segregation. *Landscape Journal*, 35, 109–125. <https://doi.org/10.3368/lj.35.1.109>
21. Kohlbry, P. (2022). Palestinian counter-forensics and the cruel paradox of property. *American Ethnologist*, 49(3), 374–386. <https://doi.org/10.1111/amet.13084>
22. Levin, I., Santiago, A. M., & Arthurson, K. (2022). Creating mixed communities through housing policies: Global perspectives. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 44(3), 291–304. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07352166.2021.1983442>
23. Michelle, B. (2017). *State of Palestine Country Strategic Plan (2018–2022)*.
24. MoLG. (2020). *Summary of the update of the sectoral plan for local government 2017-2022, mid-term review 2020* (ملخص تحديث الخطة القطاعية للحكم المحلي) (المراجعة النصفية ٢٠٢٢ -٢٠١٧ ٣٠ ٣٠). Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG). <https://www.molg.pna.ps/uploads/userfiles/file/pdfs/%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B5%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9%20%D9%84%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%85%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%2024-5-2021.pdf>
25. Mueller, E. J., Hilde, T. W., & Torrado, M. J. (2018). Methods for countering spatial inequality: Incorporating strategic opportunities for housing preservation into transit-oriented development planning. *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 177, 317–327. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2018.01.003>
26. Nofal, A. (2022). *One million units in the Jordan Valley only, is the Israeli settlement in its last square?* (مليون وحدة في الأغوار فقط، هل الاستيطان الاسرائيلي بات في مربعه) (□ الأخير). <https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2023/1/6/2023-%d9%87%d9%84-%d9%8a%d9%83%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%b9%d8%a7%d9%85-%d8%ad%d8%b3%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7%d8%b3%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%b7%d8%a7%d9%86-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b6%d9%81%d8%a9>
27. OCHA. (2017, December 21). *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—Occupied Palestinian territory | Humanitarian facts and figures*. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - Occupied Palestinian Territory. <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/humanitarian-facts-and-figures>
28. Palestinian Water Authority. (2016). *National Water Sector Strategic Plan and Action Plan (2017-2022)* (p. 59). <https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/pal179893E.pdf>
29. Rahman, O. (2019, December 12). From confusion to clarity: Three pillars for revitalizing the Palestinian national movement. *Brookings*. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-confusion-to-clarity/>
30. Rudolph, M., & Kurian, R. (2022). *Hydro-Hegemony, Water Governance, and Water Security: Palestinians under Israeli Occupation in the Jordan Valley, West Bank*. 15(1).
31. Samman, M. (2021). From moments to durations: The impact of Israeli checkpoints on Palestinian everyday life in Jerusalem. *International Journal of Urban Sciences*, 25(1), 124–148. <https://doi.org/10.1080/12265934.2020.1777892>
32. Shakir, O. (2021). *A threshold crossed: Israeli authorities and the crimes of apartheid and persecution*. Human Rights Watch.
33. Shehadeh, R. (2017, June 7). *Israel's Occupation: 50 Years of Dispossession*. Amnesty International. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2017/06/israel-occupation-50-years-of-dispossession/>
34. State of Palestine. (2021a). *National Development Plan 2021-2023*.
35. State of Palestine. (2021b). *The National Development Plan: Public Policies 2021-2023* (الخطة

- الوطنية للتنمية: السياسات العامة (2021-2023). <http://www.palestinecabinet.gov.ps/WebSite/Upload/Documents/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8AA%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A9%202021-2023.pdf>
36. The White House. (2022, July 15). *Remarks by President Biden and President Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority in Joint Press Statement | Bethlehem, West Bank*. The White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/07/15/remarks-by-president-biden-and-president-abbas-of-the-palestinian-national-authority-in-joint-press-statement-bethlehem-west-bank/>
37. Turner, M. (2019). *From the River to the Sea: Palestine and Israel in the Shadow of "Peace."* Rowman & Littlefield.
38. Weinthal, E., & Sowers, J. (2019). Targeting infrastructure and livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. *International Affairs*, 95(2), 319–340. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz015>
39. Yiftachel, O. (2023). Deepening apartheid: The political geography of colonizing Israel/Palestine. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 4. <https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpos.2022.981867>



This page is intentionally left blank



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 24 Issue 1 Version 1.0 Year 2024
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Beyond Bellephonic Sound: Exploring Some Musical Diplomacies during the Ukraine War

By Frédéric Ramel

Abstract- British Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Nadine Dorries proclaimed culture and sport the “third front in the Ukrainian war”. Russia, Ukraine but also national institutions in Western countries recognize this strong dimension in their own strategic conducts. Music is clearly part of this War whether on the side of belligerents or of third party States, cultural actors and artists even though they try to escape the dilemmas they cause. What does mean listening music in such figuration? Does it entail a “bellephonic sound” dissemination that could not be transcended or are there some experiments of musical diplomacies that tend to have another representation of otherness even in a context of war? By focusing on several musical programs and institutions in Europe since the beginning of Ukraine War, this paper aims at shedding light on the role of music as a source of recognition in strategic context from public diplomacy to people-to-people diplomacy.

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 1904



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



© 2024, Frédéric Ramel. This research/review article is distributed under the terms of the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). You must give appropriate credit to authors and reference this article if parts of the article are reproduced in any manner. Applicable licensing terms are at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

Beyond Bellephonic Sound: Exploring Some Musical Diplomacies during the Ukraine War

Frédéric Ramel

Abstract- British Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Nadine Dorries proclaimed culture and sport the “third front in the Ukrainian war”. Russia, Ukraine but also national institutions in Western countries recognize this strong dimension in their own strategic conducts. Music is clearly part of this War whether on the side of belligerents or of third party States, cultural actors and artists even though they try to escape the dilemmas they cause. What does mean listening music in such figuration? Does it entail a “bellephonic sound” dissemination that could not be transcended or are there some experiments of musical diplomacies that tend to have another representation of otherness even in a context of war? By focusing on several musical programs and institutions in Europe since the beginning of Ukraine War, this paper aims at shedding light on the role of music as a source of recognition in strategic context from public diplomacy to people-to-people diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

Music is closely associated with power, whether in peace or war times. For instance, Putin does not hesitate to rely on this art to promote the status of Russia and the prestige it can benefit from it by organizing a concert of the Mariinsky Orchestra of St Petersburg a few days after the capture of Palmyra on the Islamic State by Russian forces. Or, or course, by financing musical performances in the Donbas region after 2014. As the British Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Nadine Dorries proclaimed, culture and sport has become the “third front in the Ukrainian war”, along with the military fighting and economic sanctions. Indeed, the war itself is interpreted in acoustic terms by Zelensky, who, at the Grammy Awards ceremony in 2022, calls for filling “the silence of bombs and murdered people” with songs and melodies.

Putin and Zelensky, as many thinkers or political leaders (Gienow-Hecht 2009; Ahrendt, Ferrugato, Mahiet 2014; Ramel, Prévost-Thomas 2018), know the powers of music on souls and bodies. They are at work in armed conflicts for at least three purposes. 1. To stun the enemy. From the trumpets of Jericho to the use of acoustic torture in Guantanamo prison, the use of music aims to break the will of the opposing party, since it causes the physical destruction of infrastructures and the psychic disorientation of individuals. The broadcasting of soundtracks during psychological operations during the Vietnam war or the exposure of prisoners to metal music (or children’s songs...)

Author: Full Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po Paris, CERI, GRAM. e-mail: frederic.ramel@sciencespo.fr

broadcast above 160 dB are all examples that exploit this undeniable human vulnerability underlined by the philosopher Pascal Quignard: “ears have no eyelids”. 2. To galvanize the troops. At the front, the fife and percussion instruments that accompanied the armies have given way to the MP3s used by the soldiers to give themselves courage. But at the back too, music has its place. Performing a traditional Ukrainian song or even baroque music during bombings is an act of resistance. For the violinist Vera Lytovchenko, music becomes “the only weapon to show that I am not afraid”. So many proofs according to which the power of a nation is not measured by the military capacities in presence but by integrating the cohesion of a people. This is not quantifiable, which partly explains the failure of the main Russian prognoses that the war would be short. Undeniably, music favors the expression of this cohesion. 3. To support the effort. Music is linked to the surge of solidarity in times of confrontation. On the barricades established during the Maidan events in 2014 in Kiev, a piano is invested by the demonstrators. In the colors of the movement, it resounds Chopin under the fingers of a young virtuoso Antuanetta Mishchenkoou but also various songs, including Beatles to express the attachment to the values defended. In addition, music also serves the mobilization at a distance as revealed by the organization of concerts in support of Ukraine since February 2022, as many opportunities to collect funds for the populations remaining on site or in exile (Velasco-Pufleau. 2022a).

These three objectives are clearly strategic in nature. They are parts of military or civil sounds during war. Conceptually, parts of “belliphonic sound” that are expressed in everyday life in such contexts, as signals for informing peoples or to evaluate a situation (Daughtry 2015: 33 and s). The intensity of “belliphonic sound” varies depending to the level of proximity to the warfare (Kaltenecker 2017). But is it possible to consider music as a resource with another purpose, ie to alter this “belliphonic sound”? By way of illustration, the novelist Fedorovski points out: “In this desperate context culture remains the best bridge to peace” (Federovski 2022). But how could such a bridge be built and used? Does it even exist even though such a bridge has a name called music diplomacy, ie. this part of cultural diplomacy that uses music as a tool of relations in order to “help initiate or continue a dialogue, exchange cultural information, signal cooperation and ‘reach’ the people.” (Gienow-

Hecht 2012: 18)¹? Can't we consider musical diplomacy as an instrument to fight against war? Is it not part of these bonds of love and identification with humanity in the broadest sense, as Freud evoked in his answer to Einstein's question "why war" in 1932? If "whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war" (Freud [1932] 1993), is not music also a source of hope?

Focused on the Ukraine war since February 2022, this paper is divided in four sections. After explaining the links between music and politics and the way to deal with them based on the concepts of audibility and resonance (I), I illustrate a situation of music diplomacy failure by coming back to a Stravinsky music work (*Pulcinella*) in March 2022 (II). This cancellation is different from another reception of a Russian opera *Boris Godunov* whose fate since the beginning of the war is more nuanced between categorical refusal, maintenance in certain programs and societal mobilization against organized performances (III). Finally, a few avenues are considered in order to clarify the conditions in which audibility and resonance can be developed even in war times (IV).

I. HOW MUSICIANS AND MUSIC ARE "ALWAYS" LINKED TO POLITICS

a) *Beyond two restrictive paths*

In 1940, Stravinsky published his six lessons dedicated to the *Poetics of Music* he delivered at Harvard. Clearly against misuses even abuses of music, he declares that a new sin is emerging. This sin is none other than the lack of knowledge concerning the instrumentalization of music for other purposes than itself. For him, musical art refers to musical mathematics. It is very dangerous to bend music to objectives that are not its own. These remarks compose the "secret world", that of the aesthetic conceptions, which represents the counterpart of the sound world of the composer. This world refers to the autonomous creative acts. Music thus appears doubly abstract: because of its nature (it embodies an immaterial product of the "pure" mind) and because of its imperviousness to any context (it does not depend on any historical, social, or cultural context). Stravinsky does not only criticized the Soviet music which uses this art to ideological ends, or the Marxist approach of music which initially does not recognize the reality above all ontological of this art². His

judgment is addressed to all the musics, whatever the time or the place. It agrees with the famous assertion of the composer "music is incapable of expressing anything" and participates in the music theory in the United States whose opposition to the musicology in the middle of the 20th century was described by McCreless. Such position is still robust nowadays. For instance, the French composer Pascal Dusapin insists in his inaugural lesson at the Collège de France (Chair in Artistic Creation) on an analogous viewpoint by underlining that "music says nothing and we never say anything about music. To say about it is insane. So we say nothing about it. Never. For lack of being able to say it, we talk about it. But to speak about music always seems to plunge us in the darkness so much its subject slips away" (Dusapin 2007: 22). Stravinsky and Dusapin do nothing but deepen the "supreme mystery" that music represents for the social Sciences according to Claude Levi-Strauss. They express reservations concerning discourses dedicated to this art. They tolerate its mathematical treatment (Stravinsky), or underline the weakness of its verbal understanding because without common measure with its object (Dusapin).

From the 1920s on, some composers cultivated another posture that distanced themselves from this idea of autonomous gesture. They laid the groundwork for a "politically committed modern music with the expressionist music of the Novembergruppe (Stefan Wolpe, Vladimir Vogel, Hanns Eisler, Philipp Jarnach, Hans H. Stuckenschmidt)" (Rizzardi 2003: 158). Eisler's militant production qualifies as combat music in a context marked by a crisis of bourgeois music (from the point of view of compositional technique in particular): "the modern composer must pass from the status of parasite to that of combatant. In the interest of music, we must ask ourselves: what social attitude is most useful? If we have recognized that the present form of society has produced barbarism in music, we must try to change it" (Eisler 1996: 96). A generation is clearly inspired by such a political vocation, as illustrated by Nono, whose activity is not limited to writing music. In parallel, Nono objectified his aesthetic choices by expressing a revolutionary commitment. Moreover, he endeavored to situate his work in relation to his colleagues by elaborating a typology of relations between composers and politics: indifference to context (Boulez), revolution through culture and thus isolation of the creator from the rest of society (Kagel), deification of technique and subscription to capitalist ideology (Stockhausen), distrust of culture because class marking

¹ The Center of Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California proposed some illustrations of Music diplomacies: <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/story/10-great-moments-music-diplomacy>

² Such a simplified reading of the Marxist approach tends to deny the nuances formulated by Marx himself with regard to music or art in general. The Frankfurt School establishes a sociology of art whereas Marx seemed reluctant to undertake a study of the artistic field according to his analytical principles based on economy and market production (Bastide 1997 38). Composers inspired by Marxism also denounce this trap of a purely economic reading of musical

productions. Thus, Eisler affirms: "the evolution of the music is not concomitant of the general socio-economic evolution. This is why it would be difficult to directly link the evolution of musical forms to economic evolution. Even when such a parallel seems to exist, it is rather a matter of a relationship of successive mediations than of a direct mechanical link" (Eisler, 1998: 176.)

persists (left-wing musicians), rejection of aristocratic and Eurocentric values articulated with a conscious and reflective revolutionary will (Nono himself) (Nono 1993). But this perspective also appears in the sphere of the Jazz whose free movement criticizes the idealist aesthetic (Charles & Conolli 2000). Contrary to the positions defunded by Stravinsky and Dusapin, this second approach automatically lifts the "mystery" of the music thanks to the identification of the political intentions of the creator.

The present paper intends to cultivate a third way between the two postures formulated. On the one hand, it is appropriate to force open doors that the supporters of the first position would like to leave closed (going beyond the impossibility of a political discourse on music). The musical works offer indeed a "refreshing" material which allows to test a hypothesis on the political functioning of societies (Péquignot 1993). On the other hand, it seems reductive to rely only on the expression of commitments as an understanding of a musical piece as suggested by the second posture (necessity to widen the interpretation of the aesthetic act). If Nono or Cage prove to be coherent both in their discourse and in their works, other creators claim a revolutionary aim while reproducing neo-classical compositional schemes far from their ideological position. This is the case with Henze, for example. According to him, opera no longer corresponds to a bourgeois art form but to a modality of expression that is undergoing a profound transformation: "The idea that opera is bourgeois and an outdated art form is itself one of the most old-fashioned, tedious and musty ideas" (Henze 1982: 217). However, the properties of his works prove to be more conventional, especially through the frequent use of traditional sources. In other words, the link between musical material and engagement is not automatically proven (Rizzardi 2003: 158).

To trace such a third way is not an easy task, especially on the methodological level. Indeed, the analysis must articulate external and internal readings of music considered. According to Hugues Dufourt, since the 19th century, the discourse on musical art has opposed musicology (devoted to the internal logic of its language) and history (focused on the artists, the institutions, the practices). The 20th century accentuated this division of scientific work with, on the one hand, musical semiology inspired by structuralism and, on the other, positive sociology that describes the forms and distribution of cultural consumption (Dufourt 1987: 11-15). The academic literature has been enriched since and tries to think the relations between musical creation and society. It underlines the risks of a univocal (or unicolor) approach that would give priority to the historical context of the works. Such a perspective offers a framework but is not sufficient (Rosen 1998): because a minimum of endogenous "analysis" is always needed.

Besides, such a third way implies recognizing the always political character of musical actions and gestures. The latter are inserted into a public space in which both the speeches and the concert organizations confer a meaning on the musician's place within the city. These gestures can be implicit, as in the case of Daniel Barenboim. He never ceases to claim that the Divan orchestra created with his friend Edward Said does not correspond to a political normalization or a political project between young musicians in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the statements made in Israel as well as the will to organize concerts bringing together young Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians is not neutral. It is part of an undeniable process of transformation of the imaginary as to the reconciliation between the two parties. This Republic of the Divan offers in miniature a representation of what could embody the relations between the young generations having for the moment a heritage of armed conflict for decades. Beyond public statements of musicians, "music speaks" as Wittgenstein pointed out in his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (I §888). Barenboim and Saïd's orchestra shows that "music is also a way of living, it signifies and realizes, not only what each of us feels individually but also what we can be collectively" (Donégani, 2011: 10).

b) *Injunction, Audibility, Resonance*

But these gestures can also be explicit, under the constraint of power itself. Thus, the president of the Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, called for a commitment from artists, proclaiming: "the position of certain cultural figures who do not condemn neo-Nazis is nothing less than a betrayal of their people. As for the Ukrainian Minister of Culture, he turned to Western cultural institutions to prevent the distribution of Russian works" (Tkachenko 2022). These injunctions to take sides emanating directly from political power raise questions. First of all, they make the artists themselves vulnerable, as they can no longer envisage a middle way or even a position of neutrality. For example, the young Russian pianist Alexander Malozef, twenty years old, quickly found himself in a "hostage" situation abroad. He was forced to cancel three performances with the Montreal Symphony Orchestra, even though he himself had publicly expressed his opposition to the war in very strong words: "The truth is that every Russian will feel guilty for decades because of the terrible and bloody decision that none of us could influence and predict" (Quoted in Roux, 2022). Another illustration corresponds to the sanction to which the Franco-Russian conductor Ivan Velikanov was exposed. Having played Beethoven's Ode to Joy, a work elevated to the status of a symbol of Western Europe, on Friday, February 25, he can no longer conduct the performances of Mozart's Marriage of Figaro at the Nizhny Novgorod Opera.

Secondly, these injunctions raise questions in terms of procedure: who can legitimately ask musicians to express their opinion on a war, whatever it may be? Which authority has the legitimacy to do so (Mahiet, Ramel 2022)? Is it not up to the artists themselves, in their innermost being, to cultivate their own position? This is what the prima ballerina Olga Smirnova, whose grandfather was Ukrainian, suggests when she left the Bolshoi, "I must be honest and say that I am against the war with all my soul. (...) I never thought that I could be ashamed of Russia (...) but today I feel that there is a before and after"³.

In order to apprehend these links between music and politics, we propose to mobilize two concepts. The first one is that of audibility: all the properties necessary for a sound to generate an auditory sensation: frequency situated in the field of audible frequencies, sufficient intensity, higher than the audibility threshold. The human body has a more or less extensive perception of frequencies according to its biological complexion. Above 20,000 hertz, the audibility of sounds disappears in most human beings. In fact, the threshold of audibility decreases in frequency with age; it also depends on the intensity. However, the important fact is that there are frequencies above which, whatever the intensity, acoustic waves are not perceived: they are called ultra-sounds. The more or less audible character of a sound has thus a foundation first and foremost physical. But in the pages which follow, it is another source of audibility that I wish to explore. The very activity of diplomacy rests on the ability to make oneself audible on the one hand and to cultivate one's own audibility with respect to what others wish to communicate. To be audible and to welcome audibility corresponds to a consubstantial faculty of diplomacy (Mahiet, Ahrendt, Ramel 2021). It is in the extension of this societal audibility that I wish to place my reflection. By focusing on musical works that are "audible" or not, I will highlight the will to play them, to receive them or, on the contrary, to refuse listening. This recognition of a variable degree of listening (refusal, relative acceptance, promotion) will constitute the first descriptive tool used.

The second concept is taken directly from the work of Hartmut Rosa: that of resonance. According to him, resonance is above all an attitude towards our world. As a response to acceleration which entails alienation in late modernity, this attitude proposes a new relation that "is always open. If this idea proves to be true, then it cannot be expected to be a perfect plan for reforming our institutions" (Rosa 2022b: 53-54). In relation to audibility, resonance introduces a sensitive factor: that of letting oneself be touched by a work, of opening oneself to an inner vibration produced by the listening itself. Much more delicate to appreciate in its empirical materiality since it is subjective, resonance

appears above all as a form of affective expression with regard to a work. This second tool will be apprehended in the prism of the degree of opening to the aesthetic production of others considered as the very expression of what it embodies.

II. NON-AUDIBLE AS A FAILURE OF MUSICAL DIPLOMACY: STRAVINSKY AND THE 2022 MAESTRA TOUR BEGINNING IN POLAND

The first example I will take relies on a specific program in Poland after the Russian aggression in Poland, the country that welcome the first concert of the 2022 Maestra Tour⁴. This European tour supports the candidates of a competition organized by the Paris Mozart Orchestra and the Paris Philharmony in order to promote feminine conductors. The winner was a Polish woman who conducted *Pulcinella* of Stravinsky. At Katowice, for the first concert, this piece was cancelled because of the name of its creator. Let's coming back to this musical piece before introducing the main arguments that show a non-audibility phenomenon.

a) *Pulcinella* outside Russian inspiration in Stravinsky's trajectory

Written between 1919 and 1920, *Pulcinella* was commissioned by Serge Diaghilev, Director of the Russian Ballet Company, to Stravinsky. After a rather successful experiment of producing ballets to music by the Baroque composer Scarlatti, Diaghilev gathered documents and manuscripts by Pergolesi (1710-1736): two comic operas, trio sonatas and other instrumental works. Stravinsky accepted because of the popular character and the Spanish inspirations of the Italian composer. The common thread running through the various scenes was the humpbacked Polichenelle from the *Comedia del Arte*, *Pulcinella*. The eight-scene ballet tells the story of *Pulcinella*, with whom several young girls fall in love, much to the dismay of their fiancés, who seek to put an end to *Pulcinella*'s life. After faking his own murder, *Pulcinella*'s prank becomes a source of revenge. The ballet ends with the celebration of his marriage and his detractors.

This piece is often called neo-classical as a reaction to the music of the late 19th century and also partly to the dodecaphonic movement, which from the Viennese school onwards is gaining momentum in Europe. Often short, the structures of such pieces were based on typical eighteenth-century ritornello, sonata form, variation, rondo and simple binary and ternary forms. But *Pulcinella* is much more than that. It opens a sequence in Stravinsky's artistic trajectory. It opens him to the music of the past while producing his own aesthetic gesture. The resulting works break out of preconceived categories. They also disconcert. They

³ *Le Figaro*. March 16th 2022.

⁴ On La Maestra, see <https://lamaestra-paris.com/?lang=en>.

translate first and foremost the very posture that Stravinsky intends to cultivate beyond his previous experiences. He himself insists in his third lecture given at Harvard in 1940: "We have a duty to music, and that is to invent it. Invention presupposes imagination, but should not be confused with it. For the fact of inventing implies the necessity of a finding and a realization" (Quoted in Lavallard: On Line). Invention is plural in *Pulcinella*. Stravinsky transforms the original musical material (which goes beyond Pergolesi's source by integrating other musicians such as Monza or Gallo) by extending the motifs or incorporating repetitive cells. The composer adds elements without systematic reference to sources of the time, elements of his own making... These innovations do not appear as a rupture with the stylistic balance of the Baroque but as subtle additions because "It is first of all in the interstices of the general structure that Stravinsky's stylistics unfolds in a demonstrative way, in these spaces free of rules, free of constraints" (Prévost 2017).

Finally, it is worth noting the exile that characterizes Stravinsky's personal trajectory. He did not live in the Soviet Union and became an American citizen. In other words, this Russian-born composer was on the one hand, an fully critic of Soviet power and, on the one hand, he never stopped exploring all possible musical forms, never reducing himself to the register in which he was very often kept with three of his works considered representative of the "Russian soul": *The Firebird*, *Petrushka*, *The Rite of Spring*. Let us remember that out of sixty years of musical production, "only" ten years correspond to a period that can be qualified as "Russian".

b) *Pulcinella* politicised

The emergence of a political problem is initially a matter of timing and circumstance. According to Favre (1992), four different types of emergence could be distinguished:

- Progressive emergence. A procedure originating from one individual, and operating through different channels.
- Instantaneous emergence. The emergence of a problem from one field to another is sudden, as the result of a catastrophic event such as a terrorist attack.
- Automatic activation. When confidential political matters are kept hidden, transmission occurs automatically when the secret information becomes public.
- Initiative for emergence. Apolitical institutions aim to bring about collective awareness of a specific problem and be considered the sole representative of the affected population.

To a certain extent, war between Russia and Ukraine causes an instantaneous emergence of music

as a political issue. But we must bear in mind that music is "already" political because of its symbolic component and the "way of living" it embodies (Okon 2014). Besides, music can also be a source of consensus or subversion (DeNora 2003). Since February 2022, the label of Russian music, that results from a social construction, becomes a source of political denunciation. In his model of politization, Favre distinguishes two types of actors: the mediators who try to set up a link between politics and a non-political phenomenon and the inhibitors who tend to avoid such process. In our case, the Russian aggression entails the adjunction of the Ukrainian Hymn before most of the concerts organized. It was the case of the *Maestra* tour. This additive piece expresses solidarity with Ukraine as a victim. But the mediators are present in order to cancel Russian works.

When the members of the *Maestra* tour arrive in Katowice for the first concert of their European tour they prepare their first concert on March 8 that will include Beethoven, Clara Schuman, Silvia Colasanti (a contemporary composer) and... *Pulcinella* of Stravinsky, conducted by the Polish laureate, Anna Sulkowska-Migon. The director of the Polish Radio having received a mission letter from the Polish government asking her to withdraw all Russian programming and the Ukrainian Cultural Institute having also made the same request to the Polish authorities, The program saw the disappearance of Stravinsky's *Pulcinella*. Admittedly, the director told the *La Maestra* team that she would try to give back small touches of Russian culture, in homeopathic doses in the coming weeks. Although this speech is conciliatory considering that in the future this work can be replayed, it is without appeal in this beginning of March 2022. Playing the work of a Russian composer is inappropriate, especially when Katowice is already beginning to receive a large number of Ukrainian families fleeing the country.

Such a decision anticipates the calls of the Ukrainian Minister of Culture regarding cultural programming outside his country: "Oleksandr Tkachenko calls on the West to blacklist Russian culture in its entirety until the war is over" (*The Guardian*, December 7 2022). The decision of the Polish radio is symptomatic. In a country bordering Ukraine and Russia, whose history is marked by a strong resentment towards Moscow, whose memory of the communist era remains vivid, there is a closure to resonance. Anything that is considered Russian music is not (any more) audible. People are reluctant to be touched by the aesthetics produced by others (whether the creator or his interpreter). It is thus a double failure of musical diplomacy which is shown in this precise case: a failure for the work (which has nothing to do with a Russian inspiration as we have mentioned) but also for the young Polish conductor laureate whose gesture consists

precisely in being diplomatic, in establishing a bridge between a musical piece and the public.

III. BETWEEN AUDIBLE AND NON-AUDIBLE AS A FRAGILE PATH FOR MUSICAL DIPLOMACY: BORIS GODUNOV IN EUROPE

Contrary to the previous example, the opera Boris Godunov has benefited from diversified receptions which have shown a plurality of positions towards cultural banishment since the beginning of the war.

a) *An a-typical work, far away from a tsarist panegyric*

The libretto of the opera was written by Mussorgsky himself from a play by Pushkin (1830), who was inspired by the works of the historian Karamzin and the first monumental history of Russia he wrote. The story is focused on the troubled times (1598-1613), giving substance to the plot. It relates the succession of Ivan IV the Terrible leaving two sons Fedor and Dimitri. The latter died of a stab wound in obscure circumstances. Suspected of having ordered this assassination, Boris Godunov as a former minister of Ivan manages to be elected Tsar when Fedor dies. During his reign, calamities hit the country. Uprisings begin to emerge, blaming the situation on the crime that Boris perpetrated on the little tsarevich. The opera depicts the end of the reign and the opposition between a pretender to the throne (who pretends to be Dimitri) and the death of Boris in the Kremlin while his military forces help fight against the Polish troops supporting the false Dimitri. Mussorgsky remains faithful to Karamzin's interpretation, namely that of the assassination ordered by Boris to access to political leadership.

The composer made two versions. The 1869 version was censored by the Mariinsky Theater in St. Petersburg. The decision of the committee of conservative musicians is explained by the lyrical innovations, namely the disappearance of bel canto and the introduction of melodic recitative more in line with the Russian language. In addition, there is no leading female role.

The musical sobriety is also manifested through consistent choices, such as the first sounds of the bell in the coronation scene. Judged very severely by composers such as Rimsky-Korsavov, this sequence is not intended to be a demonstration of festivity but a premonition of the death knell that will be imposed at the time of Boris' death (it is a sound anticipation of the last scene). But in both cases, it is an opera that distances itself from *Life for the Tsar* composed by Glinka (1836), which was an apology for the Tsarist regime. Nothing of such an advocacy in Mussorgsky's work. On the one hand, progressive students were inflamed by his music in 1874. On the other hand, the Five, a famous group of musicians of which Mussorgsky was a member, broke

up after this new creation, even though it was considered the most representative of what Russian musical production should embody.

The second version of 1872 no longer focuses on Boris' psychological portrait in all its complexity, between tenderness towards his children and the torment of his conscience. The Russian people themselves become the central character. The end of the work no longer corresponds to the death of the tsar but to the revolt of a people but which is always instrumentalized, whether by a criminal usurper like Boris or by an impostor taking advantage of the situation like the false Dimitri who relies on the dynamics of popular protest.

If the musical treatment varies (there are fewer aesthetic innovations in the second version than in the first), the work is closely associated with a transformation of the lyrical language and the topic dealt with. This work was rarely performed during the lifetime of its creator and was even removed from the repertoire of the imperial theaters by Tsar Alexander III.

More fundamentally, three additional signals allow us to dissociate Boris from a panegyric in favor of the tsarist regime. When Shostakovich was commissioned to produce a new version in 1939, he accepted it while interpreting it as an implicit critic expression of the Stalinist dictatorship. Some composers thus saw the work as a vehicle for challenging an omnipotent power. A second indication corresponds to the rediscovery of Mussorgsky's original manuscripts, which had fallen into oblivion after Rimsky-Korsakov's consequent revision, which ensured the international dissemination of the work from 1908 outside Russia, and emphasizes the fundamental scenes through which Mussorgsky underlines his relationship with the Tsar, especially Saint Basil moment. Not only does the latter come up against the demands of his people, victims of famine and disasters that are multiplying, but he is challenged by the *Innocent* (*Yourodivy* in Russian meaning "madman of God" or mystic enjoying an aura within Russian society). He explains to the tsar the very cause of these disasters: infanticide. A first denunciation of the power exercised by Boris because of the illegitimacy of his access to the throne. Finally, the last words of the work are not pronounced by Boris but by this *Innocent*. The words can be considered prophetic, prohibiting any form of imperialist advocacy. Mussorgsky places himself from the point of view of the governed and not the powerful: "Sink bitter tears, weep Orthodox soul! Soon the enemy will come and it will be dark, dark to see nothing! Cry, Russian people, poor starving people "...

b) *From Warsaw to Milano: two different positions*

Several cancellations have been made. In Poland, the Theatre Wielki justifies this withdrawal from the program for memorial reasons, as director

Waldemar Dabrowski points out: "We are the National Opera, the Polish National Opera. Our headquarters are located in Warsaw, a city where the historical memory of the first bombs falling during the Second World War is still alive. still alive. We are experiencing a war in Ukraine, as well as the suffering of the Ukrainian people (...) Therefore, we are cancelling the premiere of Boris Godunov on April 8, as well as all other performances" (Quoted in Roux 2022: 27).

But one of the most important moments in which the divide over this work becomes apparent is the premiere at La Scala in Milan on December 7, 2022, in the presence of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. Not only is the work not cancelled, but it is also an opportunity to formulate a position on the place of music in the context of war. The Italian president, Sergio Mattarella, said: "Russian culture is an unshakeable part of Europe" (Fedorovski 2022).

This first has generated a series of strong protests. A mobilization on the square of the Scala denounced the performance, holding up signs against "the Russian terrorist state". The Ukrainian philosopher Sigov does not hesitate to see an act of propaganda behind such a performance: "Going to this show is, in my opinion, participating in something vile and toxic" (Sigov 2022). And to continue on the necessary translation in justice of all the Russian artists contributing to "militarize the culture" (notably Gergiev): "the acts of these Russian ambassadors of culture, but also of journalists who spread Putin's propaganda. They must be judged by a tribunal similar to that of Nuremberg, in the same way as the generals who order in the Donbass the same butchery as in Syria".

As for the Ukrainian Consul in Milan Andrii Kartysh, he simply calls for its deprogramming (Hagemann 2022). Faced with these critical comments, the director Dominique Meyer remains unyielding. In interviews with the press, he insists that the institution "does not apologize for anyone and certainly not for V. Putin. And to add that La Scala had organized a benefit concert for Ukraine, welcomed children from the dance school in Kiev and their parents but also canceled the commitments with the conductor Valery Gergiev after his pro-Putin statements.

Boris Godunov is the emblem of a critique of omnipotent power. Several voices do not hesitate to emphasize the very trajectory of this tsar whose tragic outcome Mussorgsky has depicted. Starting with the director of the work, Kasper Holten: "With this opera, Mussorgsky defied the power, which is one of the reasons why it should be staged. (Quoted in Reuters 2022). On top of that, the version favored by La Scala is the first one (1869), which highlights the torment of an individual in power who knows he has done wrong.

Thus, the American naturalized Russian conductor Bychkov declares: Rejecting the treasures of

Russian culture in the name of Russian culture in the name of an emotional reaction will lead nowhere. nowhere. On the contrary, it deprives mankind of works that often resonate strongly with the present. And they also denounce barbarism or autocratic regimes. Like Boris Godunov" (Bychkov 2022).

IV. MUSICAL DIPLOMACY AS MEDIATION IN WAR CONTEXT: CULTIVATING RESONANCE BEYOND AUDIBILITY

The examples mentioned show that classical music is indeed instrumentalized for political purposes in war situations. Trying to decipher these uses sometimes exposes scholars to media censorship, as Luis Velasco-Pufleau experienced to his cost when he established points of convergence between the Kremlin's organization of the concert in Palmyra and the solidarity concerts for Ukraine (Velasco-Pufleau 2022b). This awareness also leads some distributors to be cautious. This is the case of the French producer of the Red Army Choir, Thierry Wolf, who decided to cancel the ensemble's Canadian tour. members of the choir who are above all artists. But they wear the uniform of the Russian army. Under these conditions, it is not possible to promote this ensemble while there is an armed conflict in Ukraine. This aggression is absolutely illegitimate in our eyes" (quoted in Filhol & a. 2022).

At the same time, Aline Sam-Giao, president of Forces musicales and general manager of the Orchestre national de Lyon, is keen to explain to the public the reasons for maintaining "Russian" works: "When we carefully read our programming, we realized that many of the works programmed referred, directly or indirectly, to When we looked at our program carefully, we realized that many of the works programmed referred, directly or indirectly, to the hegemonic history of Russia. Whether it be Russian composers born in what is now Ukraine, such as Prokofiev, or composers such as Sibelius, whose Symphony No. 2 has become the emblem of Finland's resistance to Russia. All these works, first and foremost the Russian ones, many of which have been able to serve as a counter-fire, can enlighten us instead of dividing our cultures" (Quoted in Filhol 2022).

Such decisions can be linked to benevolent conducts in international relations that does not rhyme with mawkishness and good feelings (Ramel 2022). They are above all a disposition that may (or may not) be translated into action in a subtle manner, even in this apparent decomposition of musical autonomy we described.

For instance, the Maestra tour described above was less exposed to the cancelation process. Pulcinella did not undergo deprogramming in the Netherlands and France for the rest of the tour. Besides, the competition welcomed the young Russian candidate Maria Kurochkina, having left Moscow the day after the

invasion by taking a flight to Budapest before joining Paris. She decided not to return to Russia, feeling guilty about the situation in Ukraine. And in addition, the Orchestra Award went to a young German of Ukrainian origin Ustina Dubitsky, who is in addition to being very talented, is particularly highly mobilized against the war.

Drawing these benevolent paths in cultural diplomacy does not mean considering benevolence as the backbone of politics or foreign policies. Benevolence must be compared to a brick, to a binder as a source of civility. It does not embody a keystone like justice in society. As a cement, benevolence connects even though it identifies a delicate path because nothing allows us to impose a benevolent behavior on a third party, except by example, inviting him to adopt this form of conduct. In culture, benevolence may be linked to the process of transculturation as a way to welcome the other and to develop a thick listening of what he gives into a relation. As the Cuban anthropologist Fernando Ortiz pointed out, transculturation "better expresses the different phases of the process of transition from one culture to another because this does not consist merely in acquiring another culture, which is what the English word *acculturation* really implies, but the process also necessarily involves the loss of uprooting of a previous culture, which could be defined as a deculturation. In addition it carries the idea of the consequent creation of new cultural phenomena, which could be called neoculturation". It takes distance with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (2017) by proposing an alternative way relied on cultural exchange. That's also what Yo Yo Ma stresses when coming back to one of this album titled "Songs of Comfort and Hope" (2020).

The philosophy of *OneBeat* develops a similar perspective. This initiative of the US Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs program in collaboration with the New York City Arts Organization Found Sound Nation, "brings musicians (ages 19-35) from around the world to a region of the US for one month (...) to collaboratively write, produce and perform original music, and develop strategies for arts-based social engagement". As Nicholas Cull underlines, this program goes beyond American musicians' promotion abroad by changing the focus, ie. to "produce a musical conversation".

All these transcultural programs illustrate a people-to-people diplomacy that extends a classical cultural diplomacy limited to the same professional categories between borders (the formal State agents). For the American case, Eisenhower's People-to-People International (PTPI) created in the 1950's progressively changed in the end of the Cold War. Individuals like students or ordinary people shaped international diplomacy at the grassroots levels. This evolution shows that "the people-to-people concept, which held ordinary individuals responsible for building bonds across

borders, was flexible and enduring even as it took shape at different historical moments and against different geopolitical realities. Private individuals have been drawn to the idea of mutual understanding as a pathway to peace".

When cultural diplomacy between States is made impossible by war, is it still possible to cultivate spaces of neutrality outside official institutions? This is what benevolent conduct in cultural diplomacy suggests. Apart from state structures, individuals and associations can take initiatives in order to develop mixed concert programs, or even the creation of transcultural works. Here, the grassroots cultural diplomacy would join what makes the essence of diplomacy. When benevolence does not aim at cultivating the social agency of others, paternalism arises. Such a restraint appears in the context of war as Lieutenant Colonel Harry H. Crosby decided to change military targets in 1943, after knowing that Bonn was the birthplace of Beethoven : "we do not attack Bonn" he said . But this thick recognition of the other in cultural diplomacy presupposes two processes that can be identified since last February 24th 2022: to respect the singularity of individuals beyond their national belonging, and to help people when they ask for it.

V. CONCLUSION

In the so-called "post-conflict" period, making music is neither a substitute for politics (offering a practical alternative) nor a refuge from politics (dispensing some kind of drug to soothe one's pain) (O'Connel, Castel di Branco 2010). This would be too much to ask of the powers of music, even though music therapy was born to respond to the traumas of veterans after 1945... On the one hand, some people who have experienced war may refuse to practice music or simply to listen. The wounds are too raw, as the NGO Women to Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina has understood, which, organizing choral singing sessions, encounters women who are opposed to the very principle of making their inner chord resonate. On the other hand, post-conflict musical programs, although fueled by reconciliatory goals, find one of their main engines in a subjective search for joy, playfulness, a "normal" life ... in short, a set of reasons far removed from the goals set by donors mostly outside the field. This modesty in the pacifying effects of music does not prevent the expression of a real ambition for musical diplomacy, including in times of war. These diplomacies, which are no longer restricted to policies implemented by States, aim to weave links between individuals and communities through music. "Art should not be a weapon, but a bridge", said Maximilian Maier, a host of the Bavarian radio station BR Klassik (Dalley 2022). With the Russian aggression against Ukraine, this bridge is very delicate to build...

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Ahrendt R., Ferraguto M. Mahiet D. eds. 2014. *Music and Diplomacy from Early Modern Era to the Present*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
2. Bychkov S. 2022. « Je supplie Poutine d'arrêter de détruire l'Ukraine et la Russie! ». *Le Figaro*. 10 march.
3. Bastide, R., 1997, *Art et société*, Paris, Payot.
4. Charles, P. Comolli Jean-L., 2000. *Free Jazz. Black Power*, Paris, Gallimard.
5. Alley J. 2022 "Faut-il boycotter la culture russe? », *Financial Times London*. 31 march.
6. Daughtry, J.-M., 2015. *Listening to War: Sound, Music, Trauma and Survival in Wartime Iraq*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
7. DeNora, T. 2003. *After Adorno Rethinking Music Sociology*, New York: Cambridge University.
8. Donégani J.-M. 2011. « Préface » In Jean-M. Bardez, Jean-M. Donégani, Damien Mahiet, Bruno Moysan, dir., *L'institution musicale*, Paris, Delatour, 10-12.
9. Dufourt, H. 1987. dir., *La musique et le pouvoir*, Paris, Aux amateurs de livres.
10. Dusapin P. 2007, *Composer. Musique, Paradoxe, Flux*, Paris, Fayard.
11. Eisler, H. 1998. *Musique et société*, Paris, ed. de la Maison des Sciences de l'homme.
12. Federovski V. (2022) "Interview: «Gorbatchev, c'est l'antipoutine »". *Le Figaro*, December 10th.
13. Favre, P. 1992. *Sida et Politique, Les premiers affrontements (1981-1987)*, Paris: L'Harmattan.
14. Filhol & a. 2022. « Sur le front de la culture, le blocus a fait des victimes ». *La Vie*, 4007, 24-29.
15. Freud S. 1993 [1933]. Why War? A Letter from Freud to Einstein"? *Le Courrier de l'Unesco*. March 1993. <https://en.unesco.org/courier/marzo-1993/why-war-letter-freud-einstein>
16. Gienow-Hecht J., 2009. *Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850–1920*, Chicago, Chicago University Press.
17. Gienow-Hecht J., 2012. "The World Is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance of America", *Diplomatic History*, Volume 36, Issue 1, January, 17-28.
18. Hagemann B. 2022 « Triomphe pour la première audacieuse de "Boris Godounov" à la Scala ». *AFP*. 7 décembre.
19. Henze H, 1982. *Music and Politics. Collected Writings 1953-1981*, London, Faber & Faber.
20. Kaltenecker, M. 2017, « Paysage endivisionné », *Transposition [On Line]*, 6 | 2016 (20th March 2017).
21. Lavallard, J.-L. 2021. « Musique », *Raison présente*, vol. 219, no. 3, 2021, pp. 121-124.
22. Mahiet D. Ahrendt R. Ramel F. "Diplomacy: Audible and Resonant", *Diplomatica. The Journal of Diplomacy and Society*, 3, 2, 2021, pp. 235-243
23. Mahiet D. Ramel F. 2022. "Commentary Series on Putin's War: The Shattered Frame of Cultural Exchange?" *H-Diplo* 446, 6th July. <https://hdiplo.org/to/E446>
24. Nono, L. 1993, « Musique et révolution » dans *Ecrits*, trad. de l'ital. Laurent Feneyrou, Paris, Bourgeois, 1993.
25. O'Connell, J.M. S. El-Shawan Castelo-Branco 2010. eds. *Music and Conflict*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
26. Okon M. 2014. *Wagner – 200th Bicentenary - why do we still ban the Music? Controversies between Music and Politics*. Dissertation, Master Political Science, Sciences Po Paris and Tel Aviv University.
27. Péquignot, B. 1993. *Pour une sociologie esthétique*, Paris, L'Harmattan.
28. Prévost G., 2017. «Du littéraire au musical: transposition des méthodes d'analyse. L'exemple de Pulcinella d'Igor Stravinsky», *La Revue du Conservatoire [En ligne]*, Création/Re-création, Le sixième numéro, La revue du Conservatoire, 13/12/2017, URL: <https://larevue.conservatoiredeparis.fr:443/index.php?id=1869>
29. Ramel F. 2022. *La bienveillance dans les relations internationales. Un essai politique*. Paris, CNRS Editions.
30. Ramel F. and Prévost-Thomas C. eds. 2018. *Music, International Relations and Diplomacy. Sounds and Voices in the International Stage*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
31. Reuters 2022. « La Scala de Milan défend sa décision de programmer un opéra russe » 22 novembre.
32. Roux M.-A. 2022. « Des voix discordantes autour du boycott des musiciens et du répertoire russes ». *Le Monde*. 14 mars. p. 27.
33. Rizzardi, V., 2003, « Musique, politique, idéologies » dans Jean-Jacques Nattiez, dir., *Musiques. Une encyclopédie pour le XXIème siècle*, volume 1, Arles, Actes Sud/cité de la Musique, 2003.
34. Rosa H. 2022. *Accélérons la Résonance. Pour une éducation en Anthropocène*, Paris, Le Pommier.
35. Sigov C. 2022. "Après Poutine, libérer la société russe de la mafia du KGB sera très difficile". *L'Express*. 30 décembre.
36. Tkachenko O. 2022. "As Ukraine's culture minister, I'm asking you to boycott Tchaikovsky until this war is over". *The Guardian*. December 7th. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/dec/07/ukraine-culture-minister-boycott-tchaikovsky-war-russia-kremlin>
37. Velasco-Pufleau. L. 2022a. "Musique et solidarité avec l'Ukraine: Comment les musiciens peuvent-ils s'opposer à la guerre sans devenir un instrument des dispositifs de propagande ? " *Music, Sound*

and Conflict. 23/06/2022. <https://msc.hypotheses.org/4044>.

38. Velasco-Pufleau, L. 2022b. "La musique est-elle une arme de propagande comme les autres? Réflexions sur l'écriture d'un texte d'opinion critique en contexte de guerre". *Revue musicale OICRM*, 9(1), 181–193. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1090521ar>





GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Volume 24 Issue 1 Version 1.0 Year 2024
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals
Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Entrepreneurship Benefits in Higher Educational Institutions and its Implication on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria

By Agboola, Theophilus Olumuyiwa
Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife

Abstract- The paper examined entrepreneurial intentions within the higher educational institutions in Nigeria; it also assessed the benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions and socio-economic development in Nigeria. Primary and secondary data were used. Primary data were collected through questionnaire administration and secondary data were collected mainly from relevant textbooks, official documents and academic journals. The findings revealed that there exists a significant positive linear relationship between entrepreneurship intentions and higher educational institutions ($t = 97.8$, $p < 0.05$). Also, it was found out that 75% of the variations in socio-economic development could be attributed to the benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions ($r = +0.753$, $p < 0.05$). The paper concluded that entrepreneurship benefits in higher educational institutions have significant implication on socio-economic development in Nigeria, as it translates to the economic opportunity, eradicating poverty and unemployment among graduate students in the higher educational institutions in Nigeria.

Keywords: entrepreneurship, higher education, poverty and socio-economic development.

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 1301



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



© 2024. Agboola, Theophilus Olumuyiwa. This research/review article is distributed under the terms of the Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). You must give appropriate credit to authors and reference this article if parts of the article are reproduced in any manner. Applicable licensing terms are at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>.

Entrepreneurship Benefits in Higher Educational Institutions and its Implication on Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria

Agboola, Theophilus Olumuyiwa

Abstract- The paper examined entrepreneurial intentions within the higher educational institutions in Nigeria; it also assessed the benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions and socio-economic development in Nigeria. Primary and secondary data were used. Primary data were collected through questionnaire administration and secondary data were collected mainly from relevant textbooks, official documents and academic journals. The findings revealed that there exists a significant positive linear relationship between entrepreneurship intentions and higher educational institutions ($t = 97.8, p < 0.05$). Also, it was found out that 75% of the variations in socio-economic development could be attributed to the benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions ($r = +0.753, p < 0.05$). The paper concluded that entrepreneurship benefits in higher educational institutions have significant implication on socio-economic development in Nigeria, as it translates to the economic opportunity, eradicating poverty and unemployment among graduate students in the higher educational institutions in Nigeria. The National Universities Commission (NUC) should mandate all Vice-Chancellors to create entrepreneurship development centres and made it compulsory course for all undergraduate students irrespective of their courses or discipline as well as the Rectors in the polytechnics and the Provost in the colleges of education. Also, Nigerian government should help our young people undertake trainings in order to acquire relevant skills that will take them out of the streets and make them contribute meaningfully both to their families and the society at large.

Keywords: *entrepreneurship, higher education, poverty and socio-economic development.*

I. INTRODUCTION

In Nigeria and other countries of the world, poverty is described as a socio-economic problem that affects growth and development in the world. Poverty has been a source of concern to all nations of the world. It has been a threat to life, comfort and human dignity. More than over two billion people in the developing world are said to be living in absolute poverty. Poverty deprives man the necessities of life and dignity. It limits human freedom and empowerment also it impairs people's ability to realize their full potentials (Ahmed, 2014).

Entrepreneurship is a key driver of our economy wealth and high majority of jobs are created by small

Author: (Ph.D), Department of Public Administration Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria. e-mail: toagboola@oauife.edu.ng

businesses started by entrepreneurship minded individuals, many of whom go on to create big businesses. People exposed to entrepreneurship frequently express that they have more opportunity to exercise creative freedoms, higher esteem, and an overall greater sense of control over their own lives (Mohammed, Ogbonna & Andiliyasu, 2013).

A common theme across studies focusing on entrepreneurial intentions within existing organisations that is organisations differ in the extent to which they offer an environment that foster entrepreneurial activity. Such "fostering" environments have been characterized by for example; appropriate reward systems and top management support, explicit goals, and appropriate organization values, to name them, there were widely recognized characteristics. A fostering environment is one that enhances organizational member perceptions of entrepreneur action as both feasible and desirable (Agboola & Igbokwe, 2018).

However, contemporary studies now concentrate on the nature of the entrepreneur as an individual and this approach had generated a number of vital and important issues, such as the effect of personality traits of entrepreneurs, socio-cultural, environmental and organizational factors on entrepreneurial success. As a result, many experienced businesses people, political leaders, economists, and educationalist believed that fostering a robust entrepreneurial culture will maximize individual and collective economic and social success on a local, state, national and global scale. It is with this in mind that the national standards for entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions were developed to prepare youths and adults to succeed in an entrepreneurial economy (Dionco-Adetayo, Atanda & Mohammed, 2012).

Osuagwu (2006) agrees that entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions is a lifelong and futuristic learning process, pioneer as early as elementary school and progressing through all levels of education. The standards and their supporting performance indicators are a frame work for teachers and lecturers to use in building appropriate objectives, learning activities, and assessments for their target audience. Mohammed, Ogbonna and Andiliyasu (2013) explained further that using this framework, graduate

students will have progressively more challenging educational activities and poverty solving in the nation, experiences that will enable them to develop the insight needed to discover and create entrepreneurial opportunities, and the expertise to successfully start and manage their own businesses to take advantage of these opportunities.

The objectives of this paper, therefore, are to examine entrepreneurial intentions within the higher educational institutions in Nigeria; and to assess the benefits of entrepreneurial intentions in higher educational institutions and socio-economic development in Nigeria.

II. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Nigeria is currently passing through a harrowing experience and grave socio-economic problems arising from unemployment and poverty. The statistics of unemployment in Nigeria is quite disheartening. Unemployment has been a major challenge facing the graduate students in Nigeria today. Unemployment youths and adults had been on the increase in the last few decades. Over the years, successive administrations had introduced different kinds of policies and programmes aimed at reducing poverty but introduction of entrepreneurship in the higher educational institutions will reduce unemployment, poverty and economic opportunities in Nigeria. The main objective is to examine the benefits of entrepreneurship programme in higher educational institutions and its implication on socio-economic development in Nigeria.

a) Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of the study are to

- (i) Examine entrepreneurial intentions within the higher educational institutions in Nigeria; and
- (ii) Assess the benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions and socio-economic development in Nigeria.

b) Research Hypotheses

The hypotheses tested are as stated below:

- (i) There exists no relationship between entrepreneurship intentions and higher educational institutions.
- (ii) Benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions do not have positive effect on socio-economic development in Nigeria.

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

The role of higher educational institutions in human capital development, research and technological innovation cannot be underestimated. All over the world, investment in higher educational institutions is a critical component of national development effort. The study carried out by Mohammed, Ogbonna & Andiliyasu

(2013) gave descriptive analysis of entrepreneurship in Nigeria. They were found not formally educated and lowly skilled in the jobs they were doing. It is evidenced in literatures that skills and higher educational institutions had positive effects on enterprises' performance. They explained further that entrepreneurial education focuses on developing understanding and capacity for pursuit, entrepreneurial behaviours, skills and attributes in widely different contexts. It can be portrayed as open to all and not exclusively the domain of the high-flying growth seeking business person.

Osuagwu (2006) agreed that the entrepreneurial process of pursuing a new venture, whether it may be new products into existing products into new markets, and for the creation of a new organization is embodied in the entrepreneurial process. It involves more than just problem solving in a typical management position. An entrepreneur must find, evaluate, and develop an opportunity by overcoming the forces that resist the creation of something new. He explained further that the process has four distinct phases: (i) identification and evaluation of the opportunity, (ii) Development of the business plan, (iii) determination of the resources required, (iv) management of the resulting enterprise. Although these phases proceed in progressively, no one stage is dealt with in isolation or is totally completed before work on other phases occurs. For an example, to successfully identify and evaluate an opportunity in phase one an entrepreneur must have in mind the type of business he desired in phase four.

Entrepreneurship education as a means of realising creating jobs opportunities for the graduate students in Nigeria. Omolayo (2006) expressed his views that entrepreneurship education can oriented towards different ways of achieving jobs opportunities in the country. Some individuals who believe strongly in their own talents frequently desire to create something of their own for individual expression and freedom in their work environment. The most popular one is regular entrepreneurship opinion in a new organisation, for an example starting a new business when meaning is not provided within the organisation, individuals often search for an institution that will provide it. Corporate entrepreneurship (intrapreneurship) is one method of stimulating and then capitalising on, individuals in an organization who think that something can be done differently and better. Corporate entrepreneurship is mostly strongly reflected in entrepreneurial activities as well as top management orientations in organisation.

The need for entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions in Nigeria will serve as an opportunity for graduate students in order to be on their own instead of looking for white collar jobs in the government corridor. Arogundade (2011) agreed that entrepreneurship is a dynamic process of vision, change, and creation. It requires an application of energy and passion towards the creation and

implementation of new ideas and creative solutions. Mohammed, Ogbonna & Agboola and Igboke, (2018) they also agreed that entrepreneurship is an essential ingredient which include the willingness to take calculated risks in terms of time, equity, or career; the ability to formulate an effective venture team; the creative skill to marshal out needed resources and fundamental skill of building solid business plan; and finally, the vision and mission to recognised opportunity where other see chaos, contradiction and confusion. Ariyo (2008) confirmed that students are immersed in real-life learning experiences where they have an opportunity to take risks, manage results, and learn from the outcome. Entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions is not just teaching someone to run business. It also about encouraging creative thinking and promoting a strong sense of self-worth and accountability.

IV. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Omolayo (2006) opined that entrepreneurship is a dynamic process of creating incremental wealth. The wealth is created by individuals who assume the major risks in terms of equity, time and/or career commitment or provide value for some product or service. The product or service may or may not be new or unique, but value must somehow be in fused by the entrepreneur by receiving and locating the necessary skills and resources. He viewed the entrepreneur from a slightly different perspective that they all contain similar notions, such as newness, organising, creating wealth, and risk taking.

Osuagwu (2006) defined entrepreneurship as a process of creating something new with value by devoting the necessary time and effort, assuming the accompanying financial, psychic, and social risks and receiving the resulting rewards of monetary and personal satisfaction and independence. He explained further that the definitions stresses four basic aspects of being an entrepreneur. First, entrepreneurship involves the creation process that is creating something new of value. The creation has to have value to the entrepreneur and value to the audience for which it is developed. The audience can be (i) the market of organisational buyers of business innovation, (ii) the hospital's administration for a new admitting procedure and software, (iii) Prospective students for a new or even college of entrepreneurship, or (iv) the constituency for a new service provided by a non-profit agency.

Secondly, entrepreneurship requires the devotion of the necessary time and effort. Only those going through entrepreneurial process appreciate the significant amount of time and effort it takes to create something new and make it operational. Thirdly, this definition involves the rewards of being an entrepreneur. The most important of these rewards is independence

followed by personal satisfaction. For some profit entrepreneurs, the monetary reward also comes into play. Fourth, assuming the necessary risks is the final aspect of entrepreneurship. Because action takes place over time, and the future is unknowable, action is inherently uncertain. This uncertainty is further enhanced by the novelty intrinsic to entrepreneurial actions, such as the creation of new products, new services new ventures, and so on. He then concludes that entrepreneurs must decide to act even in the face of uncertainty over the outcome of that action. Therefore, entrepreneurs respond to, and create change through that of entrepreneurial actions, where entrepreneurial action refers to behavior in response to a judgemental decision under uncertainty about a possible opportunity for profit.

Arogundade (2011) labelled entrepreneurship as one who brings resources, labour, materials and other value greater than before, and also one who introduces changes, innovations, and a new order. He explained further that such person is typically driven by certain forces that is, the need to obtain or attain something, to experiment, to accomplish, or perhaps to escape the authority of others, to one businessman, an entrepreneur appears as a threat, an aggressive competitor, whereas to another businessman, the same entrepreneur may be in ally a source of supply, a customer, or someone who creates wealth for others, as well as finds better ways to utilise resources, reduce wastes, and produce jobs for others.

Higher education from a global perspective, economic and social developments are increasingly driving the advancement and application of knowledge. Education in general and higher education in particular, are fundamental to the construction of a knowledge economy and society in all nations. The nation looks up to higher education through its traditional functions of teaching, research and community services to develop manpower and disseminate necessary knowledge that are needed in industry and other sectors.

Agboola (2015) opines that education is understood as the totality of the formal, informal and non-formal processes that discipline the human mind to think in a way that makes the human persons functional and autonomous in a dynamic environment. As such, education is a life-long process that begins before and also transcends the formal schooling system. Education is expected to help learners identify, enhance and utilise their rationality, relativity, social and moral powers in a manner that learners are fulfilled individually and to facilitate national development. Such empowerment would lead to independence or autonomy in thought, belief and action.

Sanda (2017) observed that higher education providers in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world have come under increased scrutiny by various stakeholders,



such as government agencies, accrediting agencies, alumni, politicians, general public and the media. In modern global economy, a premium is placed on higher education. A nation is less competitive if its population is not well educated. It means that a nation's higher education system has become an integral element of its larger economic plan and a crucial determinant of future economic growth. Therefore, government has responsibility to ensure that the higher education sector is functioning very well.

Maja (2016) defined education as a production and reproduction of knowledge of people's way of life that is their culture with the aim of preparing and maintaining the social structure that will be able to guarantee social order and changes in the society. Education is one of the basic means of human and cultural self-realisation as well as a means of realising the productive power of a nation. National Policy on Education (FGN, 2004) defined higher education as the post-secondary section of the national education system, which is given of Universities, Polytechnics and Colleges of Technology including courses as are given by the Colleges of Education, Advanced Teachers Training Colleges, Corresponding Colleges and such institutions as may be allied to them.

Poverty as a social menace has gradually found its way back into the front-burner of contemporary intellectual and policy discourses aimed at enhancing individual and collective development. Poverty is a multi-dimensional problem which is wider in scope than income deficiencies; it includes various forms of deprivation, lack of access to social services and production inputs (U.N. system in Nigeria 1996) it is surprising the rate of poverty in Nigeria despite the endowments in mineral and human resources. As a crude oil exporting country, Nigeria has enjoyed oil boom during which she made windfall incomes in the last two decades. The country is also blessed with enough manpower resources to exploit the natural resources for sustained economic growth. Yet, many people are still living in poverty.

Ahmed (2014) opines that poverty is viewed in absolute or relative terms. Absolute poverty is a condition in which life is so limited by lack of food, malnutrition, illiteracy, high infant mortality and low life expectancy. Absolute poverty is a condition of life degraded by diseases, deprivation and squalor. In general, it is an inability to afford a commodity basket that guarantees the attainment maintenance of an objective minimum and acceptable standard of living (Olowononi, 1997).

Anugwom & Anugwon (2004) described poverty as a state of relative or absolute want is no respecter of geographical boundaries. In this case, poverty afflicts both urban and rural dwellers who are all subject to the realities of the same national economy. He explained

further that poverty is not merely in the impoverished state in which the person actually lives, but also in the lack of real opportunity due to social constraints and personal circumstances to lead valuable and valued lives.

Poverty, according to Castaneda (2017), "is relative to the general standard of living in society, the distribution of wealth, the status and social expectations". In this definition poverty refers to a situation and process of serious deprivation, lack of resources necessary for living within a minimum standard conducive to human dignity and well-being. It is in this category of poor that constitute the focus of this study. Poverty has become a serious problem in developing countries as a whole and Nigeria in particular. It is a ravaging economic and social phenomenon that has crept its ways to most homes in Nigeria. The excruciating effect of poverty has always been felt in Nigeria and the need to alleviate the problem to bring about the necessary synergy between growths has culminated in various studies on poverty worldwide.

According to Ani (1997), the precise definition of poverty and poverty alleviation has been controversial both in theory and policy. The exact description of poverty is defined from the persuasion of the individual who is periscoping the subject. There are scholars especially economists who perceive poverty form the point of want, need and effective demand. Psychologists may view poverty from the point of deprivation, esteem and ego. Notwithstanding the controversy, it is certain that poverty is undesirable. It is an economic and social malaise, a pervasive problem that must be addressed. According to him, "poverty may be defined as a condition of life characterized by malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, low life expectancy and high infant mortality beneath any national explanation of human decency.

Hence, poverty is a state of want, deprivation, low esteem and lack, of self-actualization for self-development". Consequently, fiscal policy if properly articulated, conceptualized and implemented can assist in poverty alleviation.

According to the World Summit for Social Development (2015) poverty can be defined as a failure to satisfy and afford the basic needs of food, clothing, housing, education and health care. Generally, this failure is represented by severe income drops. This fact makes the common theories about the poverty issue in a certain region based on the extent of the availability of goods and services in the region, one hand, and the cost of living on the other hand.

This definition appears at first, simple and plain, but studying its elements has many methodological and analytical difficulties. The poverty aspect is a very complicated one and cannot be treated with static approaches. The difficulties arise especially when attempting to distinguish between the underlying

determinants and the resulting outcomes, for these determinants often mix with the results.

Federal Office of Statistics for Socio-Economic Profile of Nigeria (2014) reports "The literature is replete with varied conceptualisation of poverty. The most common practice is to conceptualize poverty as being absolute. This considers poverty as lack of resources to consume certain bundle of goods and services. Such a bundle of goods and services may contain what could be considered an objective minimum which includes the basic necessities such as food, shelter, clothes among others". Two problems arise from this definition. First, what do we include in this objective minimum? Secondly, how do we set minimum standard for basic necessities like clothing, transportation etc. which may depend on individual taste and the prevailing socio-economic conditions within a given society (Afonja and Ogwumike 1996).

Besides, absolute poverty has been defined as the approximate maximum proportion of income that a family spends on certain subsistence goods (Watts 1967). In line with Eagle law and further reiterated by Ruggles (1990), any household that spends more than the specified maximum share of their incomes on basic needs such as food, housing, health care etc. is considered poor.

An alternative approach is to define relative poverty with respect to living standards that prevail in a particular society. An advantage of relative poverty line is that, it reflects the changing perceptions of acceptable minimum living standards. Thus, while electricity, in-door sanitation, pipe-borne water was considered essential in very rich societies, they may not be so in the poorer ones. For instance, in the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, the current practice is to define poverty line as a proportion, usually 50 percent of the average income. In some other instances, the bottom 20-40 percent of households in the income distribution are defined as relatively poor in sub-Saharan Africa, since ultra-poor rather than the poor are often the crucial target group, the bottom 10-20 percent of households may be an appropriate group.

From the foregoing, one could say that poverty has no precise definition as it is multi-dimensional and too complex therefore, poverty is more easily recognized than it was been defined.

Socio-economic development has been viewed from various perspectives. The simplest definition which could be lent more credence to as socio-economic development is the combination of social and economic development. In this case, socio-economic development includes the advancement or improvement in the standard of living and the increase in economic life and conditions of the people.

This is the process of social and economic development in a society. Socio-economic development

is measured with indicators such as GDP, life expectancy, literacy and levels of employment (Agi, 2015). Changes in less tangible factors are also considered, such as personal dignity, freedom of association, personal safety and freedom from fear of physical harm and the extent of participation in civil society. Causes of socio-economic development are basically changes in technology and in laws which is one of responsibilities of the state in the process of governance.

Scholars like Ayida (1987), Edame (2001) & Coker (2008) opine that development as an idea embodies all attempts to improve the conditions of human existence in all ramifications. It implies improvement in material well-being of all citizens, not the most powerful and rich alone, in a sustainable way such that today's consumption does not imperil the future. Chrisman (1984) as cited in Ijere (2014) views socio-economic development as a process of societal advancement, where improvements in the well-being of people are generated through strong partnership between all sectors, corporate bodies and other groups in the society.

Socio-economic development, according to IDEA (2009), emphasizes in clearer terms: developing a broad economic base to secure social welfare; prioritizing the improvement of living conditions and the welfare of vulnerable groups in society, including women and less privileged social groups, in order to eliminate structural poverty; providing equal opportunities and equal access for the advancement for all; developing an economic paradigm that does not only focus on large-scale industry and trade but also fosters small and medium sized business and focuses on the development of the agricultural and oceanic sectors, recognizing that the latter provide the livelihood for the majority of youths.

However, Hlatky and Booth (2016) identifies eliminating poverty in the villages as well as the urban areas; developing a balanced economic system that is open and transparent and eliminates corruption, collusion and nepotism, as well as the monopolistic and oligopolistic systems which provide protection and privilege only to a small political and economic elite; and developing an economic system that is not overly dependent on foreign loans, as well as an economic system that addresses regional disparities.

V. RESEARCH METHOD

Lagos state was purposively chosen to represent Nigeria due to its cosmopolitan nature and availability of youths from diverse Nigerian ethnic groups. The study was conducted in Lagos West Senatorial District of Lagos State, Nigeria. Lagos west Senatorial District comprises seven local government areas. The choice of the study areas is premised on the prevalence of unemployment of graduate students in the



area. Most graduate students in this area are otherwise indulging in cyber-café crime, kidnapping, and robbery act (Socio-Economic Profile, 2016). Four local governments were chosen as the study area. These are Badagry, Ojo, Amuwo-Odofin and Alimosho local government areas. In each of the local government area, one hundred (100) respondents were selected for the administration of questionnaire, totaling the sum of four hundred (400) respondents. The respondents included the graduate students, applicants, self-employed, and civil servants. Both primary and secondary data were utilised for this study. The primary data comprised household survey through the use of structured questionnaires which were distributed to the mentioned respondents. The secondary data were sourced from

relevant textbooks, official documents not academic journals. Both inferential and descriptive statistics were used Likert scale while the inferential statistics included t-value, simple linear regression and the analysis of variance

VI. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Structured questionnaires were used as the instrument for the collection of data. Data presentation covers findings of entrepreneurship benefit and socio-economic development in Nigeria and degree of compliance with the respondents. Data collected were analysed using simple linear regression and content analysis.

Table 1: Status of the Sample Used

Names of Local Government	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Badagry	100	25
Ojo	100	25
Amuwo-Odofin	100	25
Alimosho	100	25
Total	400	100

Source: Agboola, 2023

Table 2: Entrepreneurship Intentions and Higher Educational Institutions

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	143	36
Agree	152	38
Undecided	15	4
Disagree	60	15
Strongly Disagree	30	7
Total	400	100

Source: Agboola, 2023

a) Response

All the questions were asked on two objectives. The respondents are summarised as in Table 1 below. The entrepreneurship intentions in higher educational institutions

Table 1: presented below shows that there exists a linear relationship between entrepreneurship intentions and

higher educational institutions ($t = 95.6, p < 0.05$). It was then concluded that this relationship is statistically significant. Hence, the result shows that there is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between the entrepreneurship intentions and higher educational institutions.

Table 1: Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Entrepreneurship Intentions in the Higher Educational Institutions

Regression	Statistics
Multiple R	0.999836
R Square	0.999672
Adjusted R Square	0.999562
Standard Error	1.334627
Observations	5

ANOVA						
	df	SS	MS	F	Significance F	
Regression	1	1627.266	16272.66	9135.63	2.52E-06	
Residual	3	5.343	1.78123			
Total	4	1627.8				

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%	Lower 95.0%
Intercept	0.504854	1.023712	0.493161	0.655741	-2.75305	3.762762	-2.75305
Percentage	3.974757	0.041585	95.58049	2.52E-06	3.842414	4.107101	3.842414

a. Predictors: (Constant), Entrepreneurship (t = 95.6)
 b. Dependent Variable: Higher Educational Institutions
 Source: Agboola, 2023.

Table 3: Benefit of Entrepreneurship Intentions in Higher Educational Institutions

Options	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Strongly Agree	153	38
Agree	132	33
Undecided	10	2
Disagree	65	16
Strongly Disagree	45	11
Total	400	100

Source: Agboola, 2023

b) Hypothesis Two

Benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions do not have positive effect on socio-economic development in Nigeria.

The p-value for each term tests the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero (no effect). A low p-value (< 0.05) indicates that we can conclude the study by rejecting the null hypothesis. In other words, a predictor that has a low p-value is likely to be a meaningful addition to regression model because changes in the predictor's value are related to changes in the response variable.

The hypothesis two which states that "Benefits of entrepreneurship objective do not have positive effect

on socio-economic development in Nigeria" was rejected at $R=.75$, $R^2= .999$, $F(1, 5) = 4547.29$; $p < .05$. This implies that the simple linear regression predicted significant benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions on socio-economic development in Nigeria. Hence, 75% of the variations in socio-economic development could be attributed to the benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions, that is, benefits of entrepreneurship in higher educational institution could have likelihood of 75% positive effects, if adequately harnessed, on socio-economic development in Nigeria ($r = +0.75$, $f(1, 399) = 4547.29$, $p < 0.05$).

Table 2: Summary of Analysis of Variance for the Benefits of Entrepreneurship in Higher Educational Institutions

SUMMARY OUTPUT	
Regression	Statistics
Multiple R	0.999967
R Square	0.999934
Adjusted R Square	0.999912
Standard Error	0.141775
Observation	5

ANOVA^b R=0.999967 R²=0.999934

Model	Df	Sum of Square	Mean Square	F	Significance
Regression	1	913.94	913.94	45469.29	.000 ^a
Residual	399	0.0603	0.0201		
Total	400	914			

	Coefficients	Standard Error	t-Statistic	P-value	Lower 95%	Upper 95%
Intercept	-0.42183	0.1148577	-3.6726	0.03493	-0.78735	-0.0563

a. Predictors: (Constant), Entrepreneurship Benefits
 b. Dependent Variable: Higher Educational Institutions
 Source: Agboola, 2023

VII. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

The work investigated empirical analysis of transforming higher educational institutions through entrepreneurship in Nigeria. The investigation carried out in this study revealed that entrepreneurship played a very important role to the higher educational institutions in Nigeria. It also played a leading role in the socio-economic transformation through innovation and social engineering. The higher educational institutions in Nigeria through the federal, state and local governments had the duties of employment and job securing to the people of Nigeria. The study revealed that the higher educational institutions have performed below expectation. Moreover, some of the reasons for the higher educational institutions failure through the respondents including non-inclusion of entrepreneurship in the higher education curriculum, the introduction of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions are not evenly studied in most higher educational institutions in Nigeria and the need for appropriate action to be taken is to design, build and sustain an effective and efficient entrepreneurship curriculum in the higher educational institutions for national development. The study observed that the aforementioned has made the Nigerian people to see and understand the intentions, effects and benefits of entrepreneurship in the higher educational institutions in Nigeria.

The position was underpinned by different researchers and authors that is, thus, entrepreneurship benefits and skills development to Agboola and Igbokwe (2018), go beyond training and education, it also involves a process of human capacities building through formal and informal training inculcating in the entrepreneur basic skills. Such basic skills are financial skills, technical skills, creative skills, managerial skills, intellectual skills, marketing skills, communication skills and technological skills.

Agboola and Igbokwe (2018) observed that the failure of Nigeria's higher educational institutions is hinged on their products' (graduates) lack of the skills

required by the labour market and that the trend had resulted in mass graduate unemployment, since they would have assisted them to be self-reliant.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

From the overall analysis of this study, it could be noticed that there is significant improvement in some graduate applicants in establishing small scale businesses in selected local government areas of Lagos West Senatorial District in Lagos State. The contribution of entrepreneurship in higher educational institutions on poverty and unemployment through graduate students and Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) with more significant in entrepreneurship is encouraged at all level in the state especially at local and community level.

Entrepreneurship education training helps individuals to be empowered and escaped poverty by providing them with the skill and knowledge to raise their capital, output and wealth. The wide spread of skills and knowledge acquisition centres in all the local government and local council development areas in Nigeria is a clear indication of the acceptance of entrepreneurship education and training by federal and state governments, the following recommendations are made:

- (i) Entrepreneurship education should be inculcated into the school curriculum to develop and promote human resource empowerment through entrepreneurial skill acquisition training.
- (ii) Government should increase the Graduate Internship Scheme (GIS) monthly salary in order to be useful to the applicant so as to establish a small-scale business.
- (iii) The National Universities Commission (NUC) should mandate all Vice-Chancellors to create entrepreneurship development centres and made it compulsory course for all undergraduate students irrespective of their courses or discipline as well as the Rectors in the polytechnics and the Provost in the colleges of education.

- (iv) Benefits from entrepreneurship education are not evenly distributed among primary, secondary schools even in the higher educational institutions where the needs are the same. The relevant authorities should look into this with the view to making the impacts equally felt nationwide.

REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

1. Afonja, B. and Ogwumike, O. (1996). Poverty and Causes in Proceedings of National Workshop on Integration of Poverty Alleviation Strategies. November 27- Dec. 1, 1995.
2. Agboola, T. O. (2016). Appraising the Role of Higher Education and National Development in Nigeria: *ABU Journal of Public Administration*. Ahmadu Bello University. 5 (1), 142-159.
3. Agboola, T.O. & Igbokwe, P.I. (2018). Entrepreneurship Education as Synergy to Unemployment Reduction Among Nigerian Graduates: Issues and Challenges. *Sokoto Journal of Management Studies*, 16 (3), 27-46.
4. Agi, S. P. I. (2015). *An Approach to the Study of Organisation of Government*. Calabar: Wusen Press Ltd.
5. Ahmed, A. V. (2014), Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Poverty Eradication Programme in Kogi West Senatorial District, *Journal of Economic Studies*. 1(1), 41-48.
6. Ani, A. (1997). *Fiscal Policy and Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria*: In Proceedings of the First National Workshop on Micro-Credit in Nigeria. Held on 10th - 12th, June, 1997 at Abuja. 103-107.
7. Anugwon, E. E. & Anugwon, K.N. (2004). The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and Urban Poverty in South Eastern Nigeria: A study of Wage Earner. *A paper Report Submitted to CODESRIS*, Dakar, Senegal.
8. Ariyo, D. (2008). Small Firms are the Backbone of the Nigerian Economy. Retrieved April 23 2016 from <http://www.africaeconomicanalysis.org>.
9. Arogundade, B. B. (2011). Entrepreneurship Education: An Imperative for Sustainable Development in Nigeria. *Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy Studies*. 2(1). 26-9.
10. Ayida, A. A. (1987). *Reflections on Nigeria Development*. Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited.
11. Castaneda, T (2017). *Combating Poverty. Innovative Social Reforms in Chile during 1980's*, Ibadan: Evans Publishers.
12. Coker, M. A. (2008). The State, Industrialization and Direct Foreign Investment in Nigeria, 1960-2005 A Published Ph.D Dissertation, School of Post Graduate Studies, University of Jos, Jos Nigeria.
13. Dionco-Adetayo, E. D., Atanda, F. A. & Mohammed, F. (2012). Entrepreneurship Knowledge and Skills Capacity Factors in Translating Economic Opportunities into Micro Enterprises. In T. O. Asaolu & R. O. Salawu (ed), *Issues and Challenges in Accounting, Governance and Business Development in the 21st Century*, July 10-13. OAU, Nigeria.
14. Edame, G. E. (2001). *Development Economics and Planning in Nigeria*. Benin: Harmony Books.
15. Federal Government of Nigeria, (2004). *Ten Year Programme of Development and Social Welfare for Nigeria*, Lagos: Government Press.
16. Federal Office of Statistics (2016), *Social-Economic Profile of Nigeria*. Lagos, Nigeria.
17. Hlatky, S. & Booth, P. (2016). *Understanding Reality: A Commonsense Theory of the Original Cause*. New York: Jon Carpenter Publishing.
18. Maja, T. (2016). *Nigeria Education Sector Analysis: An Analytical Synthesis of Performance and Main Issues*, New York: Being document produced for the World Bank.
19. Mohammed, A., Ogbonna, M. S. & Andiliyasu. A. M. (2013). Transforming Nigeria through Entrepreneurial Science Education. *Journal of Social and Policy Issues*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Pp. 137-140.
20. Olowononi, G. D. (1997). Towards a Sustainable Programme for Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria: *In Poverty Alleviation in Nigeria*. Selected Papers for the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society (NES).
21. Omolayo, B. (2006). Entrepreneurship in Theory and Practice. In F. Omotosho, T. K. O. Aluko, O. J. Wale Awe, & G. Aaramola, (ed). *Introduction to Entrepreneurship Development in Nigeria*, Ado-Ekiti: UNAD Press.
22. Osuagwu, I. (2006). Entrepreneurship in a Developing Economy: Empirical Evidence from Nigeria Business Organisations. *International Journal of Entrepreneurship*, 6(2), 19-32.
23. Ruggles, P. (1990), Drawing the line of Alternative Poverty Measures: Their Implications for Public Policy. *Urban Institute Journal*, Washington DC. 67-80.
24. Sanda, A. O. (2017). *Managing Nigerian Universities*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd.
25. See, http://www.idea.int/publications/country/upload/9_socio_economic_development.pdf
26. Watts, H. W. (1976). An Approach to the Determination of Differential Poverty and Income Thresholds. *Journal of Human Resources*, 2(1). 2-18.
27. World Health Organisation (1995). Position Paper on Health in Social Development. In *World Summit for Social Development*, Copenhagen, March, 1995.

GLOBAL JOURNALS GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 2024

WWW.GLOBALJOURNALS.ORG

MEMBERSHIPS

FELLOWS/ASSOCIATES OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

FSSRC/ASSRC MEMBERSHIPS

INTRODUCTION



FSSRC/ASSRC is the most prestigious membership of Global Journals accredited by Open Association of Research Society, U.S.A (OARS). The credentials of Fellow and Associate designations signify that the researcher has gained the knowledge of the fundamental and high-level concepts, and is a subject matter expert, proficient in an expertise course covering the professional code of conduct, and follows recognized standards of practice. The credentials are designated only to the researchers, scientists, and professionals that have been selected by a rigorous process by our Editorial Board and Management Board.

Associates of FSSRC/ASSRC are scientists and researchers from around the world are working on projects/researches that have huge potentials. Members support Global Journals' mission to advance technology for humanity and the profession.

FSSRC

FELLOW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

FELLOW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL is the most prestigious membership of Global Journals. It is an award and membership granted to individuals that the Open Association of Research Society judges to have made a 'substantial contribution to the improvement of computer science, technology, and electronics engineering.

The primary objective is to recognize the leaders in research and scientific fields of the current era with a global perspective and to create a channel between them and other researchers for better exposure and knowledge sharing. Members are most eminent scientists, engineers, and technologists from all across the world. Fellows are elected for life through a peer review process on the basis of excellence in the respective domain. There is no limit on the number of new nominations made in any year. Each year, the Open Association of Research Society elect up to 12 new Fellow Members.



BENEFIT

TO THE INSTITUTION

GET LETTER OF APPRECIATION

Global Journals sends a letter of appreciation of author to the Dean or CEO of the University or Company of which author is a part, signed by editor in chief or chief author.



EXCLUSIVE NETWORK

GET ACCESS TO A CLOSED NETWORK

A FSSRC member gets access to a closed network of Tier 1 researchers and scientists with direct communication channel through our website. Fellows can reach out to other members or researchers directly. They should also be open to reaching out by other.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



CERTIFICATE

CERTIFICATE, LOR AND LASER-MOMENTO

Fellows receive a printed copy of a certificate signed by our Chief Author that may be used for academic purposes and a personal recommendation letter to the dean of member's university.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



DESIGNATION

GET HONORED TITLE OF MEMBERSHIP

Fellows can use the honored title of membership. The "FSSRC" is an honored title which is accorded to a person's name viz. Dr. John E. Hall, Ph.D., FSSRC or William Walldroff, M.S., FSSRC.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation

RECOGNITION ON THE PLATFORM

BETTER VISIBILITY AND CITATION

All the Fellow members of FSSRC get a badge of "Leading Member of Global Journals" on the Research Community that distinguishes them from others. Additionally, the profile is also partially maintained by our team for better visibility and citation. All fellows get a dedicated page on the website with their biography.

Career

Credibility

Reputation

FUTURE WORK

GET DISCOUNTS ON THE FUTURE PUBLICATIONS

Fellows receive discounts on future publications with Global Journals up to 60%. Through our recommendation programs, members also receive discounts on publications made with OARS affiliated organizations.

Career

Financial



GJ ACCOUNT

UNLIMITED FORWARD OF EMAILS

Fellows get secure and fast GJ work emails with unlimited forward of emails that they may use them as their primary email. For example, john [AT] globaljournals [DOT] org.

Career

Credibility

Reputation



PREMIUM TOOLS

ACCESS TO ALL THE PREMIUM TOOLS

To take future researches to the zenith, fellows receive access to all the premium tools that Global Journals have to offer along with the partnership with some of the best marketing leading tools out there.

Financial

CONFERENCES & EVENTS

ORGANIZE SEMINAR/CONFERENCE

Fellows are authorized to organize symposium/seminar/conference on behalf of Global Journal Incorporation (USA). They can also participate in the same organized by another institution as representative of Global Journal. In both the cases, it is mandatory for him to discuss with us and obtain our consent. Additionally, they get free research conferences (and others) alerts.

Career

Credibility

Financial

EARLY INVITATIONS

EARLY INVITATIONS TO ALL THE SYMPOSIUMS, SEMINARS, CONFERENCES

All fellows receive the early invitations to all the symposiums, seminars, conferences and webinars hosted by Global Journals in their subject.

Exclusive





PUBLISHING ARTICLES & BOOKS

EARN 60% OF SALES PROCEEDS

To take future researches to the zenith, fellows receive access to all the premium tools that Global Journals have to offer along with the partnership with some of the best marketing leading tools out there.

Exclusive

Financial

REVIEWERS

GET A REMUNERATION OF 15% OF AUTHOR FEES

Fellow members are eligible to join as a paid peer reviewer at Global Journals Incorporation (USA) and can get a remuneration of 15% of author fees, taken from the author of a respective paper.

Financial

ACCESS TO EDITORIAL BOARD

BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD

Fellows may join as a member of the Editorial Board of Global Journals Incorporation (USA) after successful completion of three years as Fellow and as Peer Reviewer. Additionally, Fellows get a chance to nominate other members for Editorial Board.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation

AND MUCH MORE

GET ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC MUSEUMS AND OBSERVATORIES ACROSS THE GLOBE

All members get access to 5 selected scientific museums and observatories across the globe. All researches published with Global Journals will be kept under deep archival facilities across regions for future protections and disaster recovery. They get 10 GB free secure cloud access for storing research files.

ASSOCIATE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

ASSOCIATE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL is the membership of Global Journals awarded to individuals that the Open Association of Research Society judges to have made a 'substantial contribution to the improvement of computer science, technology, and electronics engineering.

The primary objective is to recognize the leaders in research and scientific fields of the current era with a global perspective and to create a channel between them and other researchers for better exposure and knowledge sharing. Members are most eminent scientists, engineers, and technologists from all across the world. Associate membership can later be promoted to Fellow Membership. Associates are elected for life through a peer review process on the basis of excellence in the respective domain. There is no limit on the number of new nominations made in any year. Each year, the Open Association of Research Society elect up to 12 new Associate Members.



BENEFIT

TO THE INSTITUTION

GET LETTER OF APPRECIATION

Global Journals sends a letter of appreciation of author to the Dean or CEO of the University or Company of which author is a part, signed by editor in chief or chief author.



EXCLUSIVE NETWORK

GET ACCESS TO A CLOSED NETWORK

A ASSRC member gets access to a closed network of Tier 2 researchers and scientists with direct communication channel through our website. Associates can reach out to other members or researchers directly. They should also be open to reaching out by other.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



CERTIFICATE

CERTIFICATE, LOR AND LASER-MOMENTO

Associates receive a printed copy of a certificate signed by our Chief Author that may be used for academic purposes and a personal recommendation letter to the dean of member's university.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



DESIGNATION

GET HONORED TITLE OF MEMBERSHIP

Associates can use the honored title of membership. The "ASSRC" is an honored title which is accorded to a person's name viz. Dr. John E. Hall, Ph.D., ASSRC or William Walldroff, M.S., ASSRC.

Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation

RECOGNITION ON THE PLATFORM

BETTER VISIBILITY AND CITATION

All the Associate members of ASSRC get a badge of "Leading Member of Global Journals" on the Research Community that distinguishes them from others. Additionally, the profile is also partially maintained by our team for better visibility and citation.

Career

Credibility

Reputation


FUTURE WORK

GET DISCOUNTS ON THE FUTURE PUBLICATIONS

Associates receive discounts on future publications with Global Journals up to 30%. Through our recommendation programs, members also receive discounts on publications made with OARS affiliated organizations.

Career

Financial



GJ ACCOUNT

UNLIMITED FORWARD OF EMAILS

Associates get secure and fast GJ work emails with 5GB forward of emails that they may use them as their primary email. For example, john [AT] globaljournals [DOT] org.

Career

Credibility

Reputation



PREMIUM TOOLS

ACCESS TO ALL THE PREMIUM TOOLS

To take future researches to the zenith, fellows receive access to almost all the premium tools that Global Journals have to offer along with the partnership with some of the best marketing leading tools out there.

Financial

CONFERENCES & EVENTS

ORGANIZE SEMINAR/CONFERENCE

Associates are authorized to organize symposium/seminar/conference on behalf of Global Journal Incorporation (USA). They can also participate in the same organized by another institution as representative of Global Journal. In both the cases, it is mandatory for him to discuss with us and obtain our consent. Additionally, they get free research conferences (and others) alerts.

Career

Credibility

Financial

EARLY INVITATIONS

EARLY INVITATIONS TO ALL THE SYMPOSIUMS, SEMINARS, CONFERENCES

All associates receive the early invitations to all the symposiums, seminars, conferences and webinars hosted by Global Journals in their subject.

Exclusive





PUBLISHING ARTICLES & BOOKS

EARN 60% OF SALES PROCEEDS

Associates can publish articles (limited) without any fees. Also, they can earn up to 30-40% of sales proceeds from the sale of reference/review books/literature/publishing of research paper.

Exclusive

Financial

REVIEWERS

GET A REMUNERATION OF 15% OF AUTHOR FEES

Associate members are eligible to join as a paid peer reviewer at Global Journals Incorporation (USA) and can get a remuneration of 15% of author fees, taken from the author of a respective paper.

Financial

AND MUCH MORE

GET ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC MUSEUMS AND OBSERVATORIES ACROSS THE GLOBE

All members get access to 2 selected scientific museums and observatories across the globe. All researches published with Global Journals will be kept under deep archival facilities across regions for future protections and disaster recovery. They get 5 GB free secure cloud access for storing research files.





ASSOCIATE	FELLOW	RESEARCH GROUP	BASIC
<p>\$4800 lifetime designation</p> <hr/> <p>Certificate, LoR and Momento 2 discounted publishing/year Gradation of Research 10 research contacts/day 1 GB Cloud Storage GJ Community Access</p>	<p>\$6800 lifetime designation</p> <hr/> <p>Certificate, LoR and Momento Unlimited discounted publishing/year Gradation of Research Unlimited research contacts/day 5 GB Cloud Storage Online Presense Assistance GJ Community Access</p>	<p>\$12500.00 organizational</p> <hr/> <p>Certificates, LoRs and Momentos Unlimited free publishing/year Gradation of Research Unlimited research contacts/day Unlimited Cloud Storage Online Presense Assistance GJ Community Access</p>	<p>APC per article</p> <hr/> <p>GJ Community Access</p>



PREFERRED AUTHOR GUIDELINES

We accept the manuscript submissions in any standard (generic) format.

We typeset manuscripts using advanced typesetting tools like Adobe In Design, CorelDraw, TeXnicCenter, and TeXStudio. We usually recommend authors submit their research using any standard format they are comfortable with, and let Global Journals do the rest.

Alternatively, you can download our basic template from <https://globaljournals.org/Template.zip>

Authors should submit their complete paper/article, including text illustrations, graphics, conclusions, artwork, and tables. Authors who are not able to submit manuscript using the form above can email the manuscript department at submit@globaljournals.org or get in touch with chiefeditor@globaljournals.org if they wish to send the abstract before submission.

BEFORE AND DURING SUBMISSION

Authors must ensure the information provided during the submission of a paper is authentic. Please go through the following checklist before submitting:

1. Authors must go through the complete author guideline and understand and *agree to Global Journals' ethics and code of conduct*, along with author responsibilities.
2. Authors must accept the privacy policy, terms, and conditions of Global Journals.
3. Ensure corresponding author's email address and postal address are accurate and reachable.
4. Manuscript to be submitted must include keywords, an abstract, a paper title, co-author(s) names and details (email address, name, phone number, and institution), figures and illustrations in vector format including appropriate captions, tables, including titles and footnotes, a conclusion, results, acknowledgments and references.
5. Authors should submit paper in a ZIP archive if any supplementary files are required along with the paper.
6. Proper permissions must be acquired for the use of any copyrighted material.
7. Manuscript submitted *must not have been submitted or published elsewhere* and all authors must be aware of the submission.

Declaration of Conflicts of Interest

It is required for authors to declare all financial, institutional, and personal relationships with other individuals and organizations that could influence (bias) their research.

POLICY ON PLAGIARISM

Plagiarism is not acceptable in Global Journals submissions at all.

Plagiarized content will not be considered for publication. We reserve the right to inform authors' institutions about plagiarism detected either before or after publication. If plagiarism is identified, we will follow COPE guidelines:

Authors are solely responsible for all the plagiarism that is found. The author must not fabricate, falsify or plagiarize existing research data. The following, if copied, will be considered plagiarism:

- Words (language)
- Ideas
- Findings
- Writings
- Diagrams
- Graphs
- Illustrations
- Lectures



- Printed material
- Graphic representations
- Computer programs
- Electronic material
- Any other original work

AUTHORSHIP POLICIES

Global Journals follows the definition of authorship set up by the Open Association of Research Society, USA. According to its guidelines, authorship criteria must be based on:

1. Substantial contributions to the conception and acquisition of data, analysis, and interpretation of findings.
2. Drafting the paper and revising it critically regarding important academic content.
3. Final approval of the version of the paper to be published.

Changes in Authorship

The corresponding author should mention the name and complete details of all co-authors during submission and in manuscript. We support addition, rearrangement, manipulation, and deletions in authors list till the early view publication of the journal. We expect that corresponding author will notify all co-authors of submission. We follow COPE guidelines for changes in authorship.

Copyright

During submission of the manuscript, the author is confirming an exclusive license agreement with Global Journals which gives Global Journals the authority to reproduce, reuse, and republish authors' research. We also believe in flexible copyright terms where copyright may remain with authors/employers/institutions as well. Contact your editor after acceptance to choose your copyright policy. You may follow this form for copyright transfers.

Appealing Decisions

Unless specified in the notification, the Editorial Board's decision on publication of the paper is final and cannot be appealed before making the major change in the manuscript.

Acknowledgments

Contributors to the research other than authors credited should be mentioned in Acknowledgments. The source of funding for the research can be included. Suppliers of resources may be mentioned along with their addresses.

Declaration of funding sources

Global Journals is in partnership with various universities, laboratories, and other institutions worldwide in the research domain. Authors are requested to disclose their source of funding during every stage of their research, such as making analysis, performing laboratory operations, computing data, and using institutional resources, from writing an article to its submission. This will also help authors to get reimbursements by requesting an open access publication letter from Global Journals and submitting to the respective funding source.

PREPARING YOUR MANUSCRIPT

Authors can submit papers and articles in an acceptable file format: MS Word (doc, docx), LaTeX (.tex, .zip or .rar including all of your files), Adobe PDF (.pdf), rich text format (.rtf), simple text document (.txt), Open Document Text (.odt), and Apple Pages (.pages). Our professional layout editors will format the entire paper according to our official guidelines. This is one of the highlights of publishing with Global Journals—authors should not be concerned about the formatting of their paper. Global Journals accepts articles and manuscripts in every major language, be it Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek, or any other national language, but the title, subtitle, and abstract should be in English. This will facilitate indexing and the pre-peer review process.

The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
- Line spacing of 1 pt.
- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to make literary corrections and suggestions to improve brevity.



FORMAT STRUCTURE

It is necessary that authors take care in submitting a manuscript that is written in simple language and adheres to published guidelines.

All manuscripts submitted to Global Journals should include:

Title

The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

PREPARATION OF ELETRONIC FIGURES FOR PUBLICATION

Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality homan social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of homan social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

9. Produce good diagrams of your own: Always try to include good charts or diagrams in your paper to improve quality. Using several unnecessary diagrams will degrade the quality of your paper by creating a hodgepodge. So always try to include diagrams which were made by you to improve the readability of your paper. Use of direct quotes: When you do research relevant to literature, history, or current affairs, then use of quotes becomes essential, but if the study is relevant to science, use of quotes is not preferable.

10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.

Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

THE ADMINISTRATION RULES

Administration Rules to Be Strictly Followed before Submitting Your Research Paper to Global Journals Inc.

Please read the following rules and regulations carefully before submitting your research paper to Global Journals Inc. to avoid rejection.

Segment draft and final research paper: You have to strictly follow the template of a research paper, failing which your paper may get rejected. You are expected to write each part of the paper wholly on your own. The peer reviewers need to identify your own perspective of the concepts in your own terms. Please do not extract straight from any other source, and do not rephrase someone else's analysis. Do not allow anyone else to proofread your manuscript.

Written material: You may discuss this with your guides and key sources. Do not copy anyone else's paper, even if this is only imitation, otherwise it will be rejected on the grounds of plagiarism, which is illegal. Various methods to avoid plagiarism are strictly applied by us to every paper, and, if found guilty, you may be blacklisted, which could affect your career adversely. To guard yourself and others from possible illegal use, please do not permit anyone to use or even read your paper and file.



CRITERION FOR GRADING A RESEARCH PAPER (COMPILATION)
BY GLOBAL JOURNALS

Please note that following table is only a Grading of "Paper Compilation" and not on "Performed/Stated Research" whose grading solely depends on Individual Assigned Peer Reviewer and Editorial Board Member. These can be available only on request and after decision of Paper. This report will be the property of Global Journals

Topics	Grades		
	A-B	C-D	E-F
<i>Abstract</i>	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
<i>Introduction</i>	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
<i>Methods and Procedures</i>	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
<i>Result</i>	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
<i>Discussion</i>	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
<i>References</i>	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



INDEX

A

Abundantly · 3

B

Banishment · 6
Bellephonic · 1
Betrayal · 3

C

Catastrophic · 5
Coherence · 3, 2
Cohesion · 1
Combatant · 2
Conciliatory · 5
Confiscation, · 2

D

Demobilization · 3
Denunciation · 5, 7
Depiction · 3
Deprivation · 4
Disarmament · 3
Discrepancies · 3
Disintegration · 4
Disorientation · 1
Dissemination · 1, 6

E

Endeavored · 2
Exacerbate · 1

F

Floundering · 1

H

Hindered · 1
Humpbacked · 4

I

Imperil · 5
Implemented. · 2
Inaugural · 2
Infanticide · 7
Interactions · 3

N

Nuanced · 2

O

Omnipotent · 6, 7

P

Panegyric · 6
Persisting · 3

R

Reintegration · 3
Repercussions · 1
Repetitive · 5

S

Sobriety · 6
Squalor · 4

T

Tedious · 3



save our planet



Global Journal of Human Social Science

Visit us on the Web at www.GlobalJournals.org | www.SocialScienceResearch.org
or email us at helpdesk@globaljournals.org



ISSN 975587

© Global Journals